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J U D  C A M P B E L L  
Natural Rights and the First Amendment 
abstract. The Supreme Court o�en claims that the First Amendment reflects an original 
judgment about the proper scope of expressive freedom. A�er a century of academic debate, how-
ever, the meanings of speech and press freedoms at the Founding remain remarkably hazy. Many 
scholars, o�en pointing to Founding Era sedition prosecutions, emphasize the limited scope of 
these rights. Others focus on the libertarian ideas that helped shape opposition to the Sedition Act 
of 1798. Still more claim that speech and press freedoms lacked any commonly accepted meaning. 
The relationship between speech and press freedoms is contested, too. Most scholars view these 
freedoms as equivalent, together enshrining a freedom of expression. But others assert that the 
freedom of speech, unlike press freedom, emerged from the legislative privilege of speech and de-
bate, thus providing more robust protection for political speech. 
 This Article argues that Founding Era elites shared certain understandings of speech and press 
freedoms, as concepts, even when they divided over how to apply those concepts. In particular, 
their approach to expressive freedom was grounded in a multifaceted understanding of natural 
rights that no longer survives in American constitutional thought. Speech and press freedoms re-
ferred, in part, to natural rights that were expansive in scope but weak in their legal effect, allowing 
for restrictions of expression to promote the public good. In this respect, speech and press free-
doms were equivalent concepts with highly contestable implications that depended on calculations 
of the public good. But expressive freedom connoted more determinate legal protections as well. 
The liberty of the press, for instance, o�en referred specifically to the rule against press licensing, 
while the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing ensured that well-intentioned statements 
of one’s views were immune from governmental regulation. In this respect, speech and press free-
doms carried distinct meanings. Much of our modern confusion stems from how the Founders—
immersed in their own constitutional language—silently shi�ed between these complementary 
frames of reference. 
 This framework significantly reorients our understanding of the history of speech and press 
freedoms by recognizing the multifaceted meanings of these concepts, and it raises challenging 
questions about how we might use that history today. Various interpretive theories—including 
ones described as “originalist”—might incorporate this history in diverse ways, with potentially 
dramatic implications for a host of First Amendment controversies. Most fundamentally, however, 
history undercuts the Supreme Court’s recent insistence that the axioms of modern doctrine inhere 
in the Speech Clause itself, with judges merely discovering—not cra�ing—the First Amendment’s 
contours and boundaries. 
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introduction 
Governments need to restrict expression. Whether someone is falsely yelling 
“fire” in a crowded theater, lying on the witness stand, or conspiring to commit 
crimes, speech can be tremendously harmful. Yet communication is essential to 
human flourishing, and history has shown time and again that governments are 
prone to censorial abuse. An enduring challenge for any legal system is balancing 
these concerns. 
In its role as constitutional mythologist, the Supreme Court o�en says that 
the First Amendment answers this challenge. “The First Amendment itself 
reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on 
the Government outweigh the costs,” the Court recently declared, concluding 
that neither politicians nor judges may “attempt to revise that judgment simply 
on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”1 
A�er a century of academic debate, however, the meanings of speech and 
press freedoms at the Founding remain remarkably hazy. “One can keep going 
round and round on the original meaning of the First Amendment,” Rodney 
Smolla writes, “but no clear, consistent vision of what the framers meant by free-
dom of speech will ever emerge.”2 Conventional wisdom holds that the freedom 
of speech and the freedom of the press were equivalent concepts, together com-
prising what we would now call a freedom of expression.3 But another promi-
nent view is that the freedom of speech, unlike the freedom of the press, emerged 
 
1. United States v. Stevens, 599 U.S. 460, 470 (2010); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“[T]he First [Amendment] . . . is the very product of an interest balanc-
ing by the people.”). 
2. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:11 (2016). 
3. See, e.g., WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: THE EARLY SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT 15-30 (2016); 
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 170-71 (1985); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural 
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 919 & n.39 (1993); Steven 
J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Ex-
pression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1289, 1292 (1998); Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free 
Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177, 180, 204 (1984); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Free-
dom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 
640-41 (1975); Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1079-83 (2009). The term “freedom of expression” was rarely 
used in the eighteenth century but is used here for simplicity. But see Answer of the Senate of 
Pennsylvania to Governor Mifflin’s Speech, DUNLAP & CLAYPOOLE’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER (Phil-
adelphia), Dec. 14, 1795, at 3 (“The communication of sentiment, with temper and decency, is 
a right which never should be impaired: Freedom of expression will only be abused by those 
who wish to conceal, or pervert, the truth.”). 
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from the legislative privilege of speech and debate,4 thus providing robust pro-
tection for political speech.5 Still more scholars conclude that “freedom of 
speech, unlike freedom of the press, had little history as an independent concept 
when the first amendment was framed.”6 And while some scholars espouse “little 
doubt that the First Amendment was meant . . . to forbid punishment for sedi-
tious libel,”7 debates among the Founders on that topic would seem to belie any 
broadly shared original understanding of speech and press freedoms.8 No won-
der so many commentators have given up the search for original meaning, with 
some concluding that the First Amendment was simply “an aspiration, to be 
given meaning over time.”9 
 
4. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 168 (2012); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE IN-
TELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 46-47 (1985); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERI-
CAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 73 & n.44 (1999); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 292 (1996). 
5. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, REFLECTIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 66 (2007); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POW-
ERS OF THE PEOPLE 34-37 (1960); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 815 
(1999). 
6. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487 (1983); see also 
Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth 
Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 793 (2008) (agreeing 
with Anderson); Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Prag-
matism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (2011) (same). 
7. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1198 (4th ed. 2013); see also, e.g., AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION TODAY: TIMELESS LESSONS FOR THE ISSUES OF OUR ERA 7 (2016) 
(“The Sedition Act of 1798 was clearly unconstitutional . . . .”). 
8. Scholars who emphasize the indeterminacy of original meaning typically highlight the clash-
ing views over sedition. See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 2, at § 1:11. By contrast, those who take 
sides o�en argue that the opposing view was not prevalent until the late 1790s. Compare LEVY, 
supra note 3, at xii (“[T]he theory of freedom of political expression remained quite narrow 
until 1798 . . . .”), with Anderson, supra note 6, at 521 (“The Federalists who sought to prevent 
criticism of government by passing the Sedition Act were not the Framers, nor did they share 
the Framers’ views.”). For other key works, see BIRD, supra note 3; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, RE-
PRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE 
LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW (2010); Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition 
Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 SUP. CT. REV. 109; David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech 
and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429 (1983); Hamburger, supra note 3; Philip B. Kurland, The Original 
Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55 MISS. L.J. 225 
(1985); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Free-
dom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985); and Stephen A. 
Smith, The Origins of the Free Speech Clause, 29 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 48 (1991). 
9. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Story of the Sedition Act of 1798: “The Reign of Witches,” in FIRST AMEND-
MENT STORIES 13, 23 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012). For others who 
natural rights and the first amendment 
251 
But perhaps this indeterminacy stems from our own interpretive approach. 
“[T]he first key to understanding the American Founding,” historian Jonathan 
Gienapp cautions, “is appreciating that it is a foreign world,” filled with many 
concepts that bear only a deceptive resemblance to modern ideas.10 Perhaps, 
then, we have been looking for original meaning in the wrong way, instinctively 
trying to fit the historical evidence to our own conception of constitutional 
rights. 
Modern lawyers tend to view constitutional phrases like “the freedom of 
speech” as terms of art, sparking searches for those terms in eighteenth-century 
legal sources. In the context of speech freedom, that effort produces sparse and 
inconsistent results. Americans, it turns out, rarely ever used the term “freedom 
of speech.” Meanwhile, the Founders frequently mentioned press freedom, but 
they did so in seemingly conflicting ways. The liberty of the press, William 
Blackstone famously insisted, “consists in laying no previous restraints upon 
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished.”11 Founding Era commentaries about press freedom, however, routinely 
ventured beyond the topic of press licensing.12 
Proposing a paradigm shi�, this Article argues that Founding Era elites 
shared certain understandings of speech and press freedoms at a more abstract, 
conceptual level even though they disagreed about how to apply those concepts 
to particular constitutional controversies. The contested implications of speech 
and press freedoms at the Founding, in other words, have obscured their more 
widely shared meanings. To comprehend these meanings, however, we must step 
 
emphasize a lack of consensus at the Founding, see, for example, DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEF-
FERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 210 (2009); NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTER-
PRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 70 (1986); Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living 
Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 837; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971); Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the 
History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 721, 748-54 (2013); and Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Consti-
tution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HU-
MAN. 295, 326-34 (2011) [hereina�er Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Consti-
tution]. 
10. Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 935, 942 (2015). 
11. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152. 
12. See Wendell Bird, Liberties of Press and Speech: ‘Evidetestnce Does Not Exist To Contradict 
the . . . Blackstonian Sense’ in Late 18th Century England?, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2016). 
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back from the nitty-gritty details of legal doctrine and grapple with the concep-
tual foundations of the First Amendment, starting with the largely forgotten lan-
guage of Founding Era rights discourse.13 
For American elites, rights were divided between natural rights, which were 
liberties that people could exercise without governmental intervention, and pos-
itive rights, which were legal privileges or immunities defined in terms of gov-
ernmental action or inaction, like the rights of due process, habeas corpus, and 
confrontation.14 Consequently, distinguishing natural rights from positive 
rights was simple. “A natural right is an animal right,” Thomas Paine succinctly 
explained, “and the power to act it, is supposed, either fully or in part, to be 
mechanically contained within ourselves as individuals.”15 Natural rights, in 
 
13. The intellectual foundation of this language was social-contract theory. See Jud Campbell, 
Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 87 (2017) (review-
ing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOV-
EREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016)). Founding Era discussions of social-contract theory and 
natural rights were common. See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (Philadelphia, Hall & Sellers 1787); 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47; ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED 
(1775), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 88 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961); 
James Madison, Essay on Sovereignty (1835), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 568, 570 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); Gouverneur Morris, Political Enquiries (1776), in TO SECURE THE 
BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 5, 9 (J. Jackson Barlow 
ed., 2012); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 16 
(Windham, John Byrne 1795); RICHARD WOODDESON, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE: 
TREATED OF IN THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
22 (London, T. Payne & Son 1783). 
14. See Congressional Debates (June 8, 1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison), in 11 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 811, 
822 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereina�er DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 
1790), in 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971); An Old 
Whig IV, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), Oct. 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 497, 501 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereina�er DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION]. The 
Founders sometimes referred to positive rights as adventitious rights or social rights. See The 
Impartial Examiner 1, VA. INDEP. CHRON. (Richmond), Feb. 20, 1788, reprinted in 8 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra, at 387, 390 (1988); [GEORGE LOGAN], LETTERS 
ADDRESSED TO THE YEOMANRY OF THE UNITED STATES . . . 39 (Philadelphia, Eleazer Oswald 
1791); Philanthropos, NEWPORT HERALD, June 17, 1790, reprinted in 26 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION, supra, at 1051, 1051 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2013). 
15. Common Sense [Thomas Paine], Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed Ludlow, PA. 
J. & WKLY. ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, at 1; see also 1 THOMAS RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF 
NATURAL LAW 36 (Cambridge, J. Bentham 1754) (“Another division of our rights is into nat-
ural and adventitious. Those are called natural rights, which belong to a man . . . originally, 
without the intervention of any human act.”); Hamburger, supra note 3, at 919 (“[Americans] 
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other words, were those that did not depend on the existence of a government. 
Speaking, writing, and publishing were thus readily identifiable as natural 
rights. 
Though easy to identify, natural rights at the Founding scarcely resembled 
our modern notion of rights as determinate legal constraints on governmental 
authority. Rather, Americans typically viewed natural rights as aspects of natural 
liberty that governments should help protect against private interference 
(through tort law, property law, and so forth) and that governments themselves 
could restrain only to promote the public good and only so long as the people or 
their representatives consented.16 And assessing the public good—generally un-
derstood as the welfare of the entire society—was almost entirely a legislative 
task, leaving very little room for judicial involvement.17 Natural rights thus pow-
erfully shaped the way that the Founders thought about the purposes and struc-
ture of government, but they were not legal “trumps” in the way that we o�en 
talk about rights today. 
By the late eighteenth century, however, expressive freedom also connoted a 
variety of more determinate legal protections. The liberty of the press, for 
instance, o�en referred specifically to the rule against press licensing; by prohib-
iting prior restraints on the press, this rule put juries in charge of administering 
governmental restrictions of expression through criminal trials. Meanwhile, the 
freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing ensured that well-intentioned 
statements of one’s views were immune from regulation. In this limited way, ex-
pressive freedom entailed legal “trumps.” Much of our modern confusion about 
the history of speech and press freedoms stems from the way that the 
Founders—immersed in their own constitutional language—silently shi�ed 
between these two dimensions of expressive freedom. 
Indeed, Founding Era rights discourse featured a symbiotic relationship be-
tween natural rights and legal rules.18 In part, the common law indicated the 
scope of natural rights both because of a presumed harmony between the com-
mon law and natural law and because common-law rules were presumptively 
based on popular consent and consistent with the public good. At the same time, 
the Founders sometimes used natural law—the law of reason—to help shape 
their understandings of positive law. To recognize a natural right, in other words, 
implied recognition of its customary legal protections, and vice versa.19 
 
understood natural liberty to be the freedom an individual could enjoy as a human in the 
absence of government.”). 
16. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 92-98. 
17. See id. at 96-98. 
18. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 10 (1969); 
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 581 (2006). 
19. See infra Section II.D. 
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The Founders, however, o�en disagreed about the precise relationship be-
tween natural rights and the common law, leading to a confusing array of state-
ments about expressive freedom. In general, Federalists based their views about 
natural rights on legal authority, not practical experience or abstract reasoning, 
making judicial accounts of the common law decisive. But an opposing interpre-
tive tradition championed “popular” understandings of constitutional and legal 
commands.20 Advocates of this view, Saul Cornell explains, were “deeply suspi-
cious of ceding so much authority to lawyers and judges,” sometimes even going 
so far as to compare “the chicanery of lawyers with the practices of ‘Romish 
priests in matters of religion.’”21 For these “popular” interpreters, who were of-
ten themselves erudite elites, practical experience and common sense were para-
mount. 
Because of these methodological disagreements, Americans who shared an 
understanding of speech and press freedoms as natural rights o�en profoundly 
disagreed about the legal implications of the First Amendment. Federalists in the 
late 1790s, for instance, typically invoked the English common law to defend the 
constitutionality of sedition prosecutions, while many Republicans appealed to 
practical experience and common sense to reach the opposite conclusion. Yet this 
virulent disagreement among contending elites began with a shared recognition 
of expressive freedom as a natural right. This Article’s reframing thus illustrates 
that identifying methodological differences among the Founders can help clarify, 
and not merely complicate,22 the historical meanings of constitutional concepts. 
Debates about expressive freedom also were wide ranging because the 
Founders o�en vehemently disagreed about which regulations of speech pro-
moted the public good. Many viewed narrowly drawn sedition laws as enhancing 
public debate by combating efforts to mislead the public.23 Others thought that 
 
20. See Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution, supra note 9, at 296-97, 306. 
As Cornell notes, “the conflict over legal interpretation . . . exist[ed] along a spectrum in 
which elite culture shaded gradually into a more popular plebian culture.” Id. at 309. 
21. Id. at 306 (quoting [BENJAMIN AUSTIN], HONESTUS, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRAC-
TICE OF THE LAW 20 (Boston, Adams & Nourse 1786)). 
22. Scholars have widely noted how methodological disagreements among the Founders can com-
plicate efforts to recover original meanings. See, e.g., id. at 296-98; Larry Kramer, Two (More) 
Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912-13 (2008); Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555-56, 561, 571-73 (2003). 
23. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ADDISON, A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURIES OF THE COUNTY COURTS OF 
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 13 (Vergennes, Samuel Chipman 1799) 
(arguing that sedition leads to the “greatest of all plagues, the corruption of public opinion”). 
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sedition laws created more harm than good by chilling too much useful speech.24 
But properly understood, this conflict did not reflect profound divisions about 
the concept of expressive freedom. Rather, the Founders disagreed about how to 
apply that concept to sedition laws.25 
To set the stage for this historical argument, Part I discusses the Article’s his-
torical contribution and previews its potential modern implications. It begins by 
offering a brief overview of related scholarship. This overview sets in relief the 
Article’s focus on the interplay between natural rights and the common law. The 
Part then explores the ways that this revisionist account could influence modern 
understandings of the First Amendment. In particular, it emphasizes that the 
Speech and Press Clauses were originally rooted in a broader Founding Era dis-
course about natural rights—not, as modern scholarship generally posits, a par-
ticular theory about why expression warrants constitutional protection. 
Part II then turns to the history, drawing out three different meanings of 
speech and press freedoms at the Founding. First, speech and press freedoms 
were natural rights that were regulable in promotion of the public good, mean-
ing the good of the society as a whole.26 Second, the Founders widely thought 
that the freedom to make well-intentioned statements of one’s views belonged 
to a subset of natural rights, known as “unalienable” natural rights, that could 
not be restricted in promotion of the public good and thus fell outside legislative 
 
24. See, e.g., JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS OF 
THE PRESS, AND THE UNCOUNTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 83 (New York, John-
son & Stryker 1801) (describing the “laws of society”—akin to the proverbial marketplace of 
ideas—as “fully sufficient to the purpose” of handling malicious falsehoods); TUNIS WORT-
MAN, A TREATISE, CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 170 (New 
York, George Forman 1800) (“Public prosecutions for libels are . . . more dangerous to Soci-
ety than the misrepresentation which they are intended to punish.”). This view developed 
among English radicals, whose writings circulated in America. See, e.g., RICHARD PRICE, OB-
SERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE MEANS OF MAKING 
IT A BENEFIT TO THE WORLD 25 (London, Barlow & Babcock 1784) (arguing that the “evils” of 
granting civil authority to regulate speech outweigh the benefits); James Burgh, Of the Liberty 
of Speech and Writing on Political Subjects, in 3 POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 246, 254 (London, 
Edward and Charles Dilly 1775) (“For if you punish the slanderer, you deter the fair inquirer.”). 
25. Readers need not accept a general distinction between meanings and expected applications in 
order to recognize my point, which is simply that individuals could simultaneously agree that 
speaking, writing, and printing were natural rights regulable in the public interest and disagree 
about whether particular governmental restrictions of speaking and printing promoted the 
public good. For arguments in favor of a general distinction between meanings and expected 
applications, see Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 559 (2006); and Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 383 (2013). 
26. See infra Section II.A. 
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authority to curtail.27 Third, Americans recognized a variety of common-law 
rules that offered more determinate legal protection for expressive freedom.28 A 
concluding Section then explores the contested interrelationship between these 
concepts.29 
Part II, it bears emphasis, aims to recover the principles that Founding Era 
elites had in mind when designing and applying the Speech and Press Clauses, 
but it is not directly concerned with the original meanings of those provisions. 
Postponing that discussion until Part III is deliberate. Indeed, this Article de-
fends the view that we cannot understand the meaning of the First Amendment 
until we first understand the forgotten language in which it was written. 
With this conceptual framework in mind, Part III offers a novel interpreta-
tion of the original meanings of the Speech and Press Clauses. The argument 
proceeds by connecting the text and early interpretations of the First Amend-
ment to the framework developed in Part II. Throughout the ratification debates 
and into the First Congress, supporters of a bill of rights pushed for constitu-
tional recognition of existing concepts. Therefore, to the extent that Founding 
Era elites originally understood the First Amendment as imposing determinate 
limits on congressional power, these limits were delineated by accepted com-
mon-law rules and by the inalienable natural right to make well-intentioned 
statements of one’s thoughts. Beyond these principles, however, the First 
Amendment le� unresolved whether certain restrictions of expression promoted 
the public good. In laying out this argument, this Part also rebuts competing 
scholarly accounts of the original meanings of the Speech and Press Clauses and 
emphasizes the ways in which these Clauses had distinct meanings. 
The Article then concludes by returning to the modern implications of First 
Amendment history. A point of emphasis is the historical distance that separates 
us from our constitutional past. If the Supreme Court wanted to apply only those 
legal rules that the Founders recognized (or likely would have recognized), a 
huge swath of modern case law would have to go. There is no evidence, for in-
stance, that the Founders denied legislative authority to regulate expressive con-
duct in promotion of the public good—a principle that runs contrary to countless 
modern decisions. 
But beyond case-specific implications is a more fundamental point: the early 
history of speech and press freedoms undercuts the mythological view that foun-
dational principles of modern doctrine inhere in the original Speech Clause. The 
Justices, for instance, have repeatedly asserted that the First Amendment itself 
 
27. See infra Section II.B. 
28. See infra Section II.C. 
29. See infra Section II.D. 
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strictly disfavors content-based regulations of speech.30 And when the Court re-
cently derided the government’s suggestion that some speech might be deemed 
“low value” and thus subject to less rigorous scrutiny, it acted as if the Speech 
Clause contains a full set of doctrinal rules.31 Lowering judicial scrutiny for less 
valuable forms of speech, the Court explained, would “revise th[e] judgment” 
that “[t]he First Amendment itself reflects.”32 Doubling down on this idea, the 
Court later insisted that “[t]he whole point of the First Amendment” was to pre-
vent speech restrictions based on “a generalized conception of the public good.”33 
Simply put, however, the First Amendment did not enshrine a judgment that 
the costs of restricting expression outweigh the benefits. At most, it recognized 
only a few established rules, leaving broad latitude for the people and their rep-
resentatives to determine which regulations of expression would promote the 
public good. Whether modern doctrine serves those original principles is then a 
judgment that we must make. The original meanings of the Speech and Press 
Clauses do not provide the answer. 
i .  stakes and implications 
Before turning to the eighteenth century, it is worth making some prelimi-
nary remarks about this Article’s contribution to historical scholarship and its 
implications for modern doctrine. 
A. Scholarly Contribution 
This Article charts a new historical path by concentrating on the conceptual 
meanings, and not merely the legal dimensions, of speech and press freedoms. 
For much of the twentieth century, scholarship about expressive freedom at the 
Founding overwhelmingly focused on the compatibility of sedition prosecutions 
with the First Amendment.34 While historically enlightening, much of this 
 
30. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Mem-
bers of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 128 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
31. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-71 (2010). 
32. Id. at 470; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544, 2547 (2012) (plurality opinion) 
(summarizing the same idea, with application to false statements). 
33. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014). 
34. Compare ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 17-24 (1920) (insisting that the First 
Amendment was designed to bar seditious libel prosecutions), with LEONARD W. LEVY, LEG-
ACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 2-3 (1960) 
(arguing that historical evidence “points strongly in support” of the conclusion that the First 
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scholarship offered little clarity about the First Amendment’s original meaning 
beyond the topic of sedition. Some historians and legal academics have pursued 
that effort more directly, but the literature falls far short of consensus. Scholars 
typically treat speech and press freedoms as common-law rules, leading many to 
emphasize the ban on prior restraints.35 Others, relying both on Federalist claims 
during the ratification debates and on Republican arguments against the Sedi-
tion Act, insist that the Speech and Press Clauses categorically withdrew all fed-
eral authority over expression.36 Still more assert that the Speech Clause was lin-
guistically and substantively derived from the legislative privilege of speech and 
debate.37 Finally, many have simply thrown up their hands and declared the en-
terprise to be hopeless or misguided.38 
A few scholars have identified a connection between the First Amendment 
and natural rights, but none has accounted for the multifaceted way that the 
Founders referred to speech and press freedoms. Philip Hamburger, for instance, 
classifies both freedoms as natural rights, emphasizing governmental authority 
to prevent encroachment on the rights of others.39 Yet Hamburger never grap-
ples with the complex relationship between natural rights and customary legal 
rules—an issue that profoundly shaped Founding Era disputes about expressive 
 
Amendment “le� the law of seditious libel in force”), and Rabban, supra note 8, at 796 (argu-
ing that Levy’s focus on seditious libel led him to overlook genuine and growing support 
among the Founders for a greater degree of expressive freedom). 
35. See, e.g., Vikram Amar, Introduction to THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH: ITS CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 13, 13 (Vikram David Amar ed., 
2009); Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2180-81 
(2015); Marc Lendler, “Equally Proper at All Times and at All Times Necessary”: Civility, Bad 
Tendency, and the Sedition Act, 24 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 419, 426 n.28 (2004). 
36. See BIRD, supra note 3, at 77; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 47-48 (1991); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the 
First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
1539, 1556, 1567-71 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Reli-
gious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1111-14 (1994); 
Mayton, supra note 8, at 97, 119. 
37. See supra note 4 (collecting sources). 
38. See supra notes 2 and 9 and accompanying text. 
39. See Hamburger, supra note 3, at 908-11. 
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freedom.40 Meanwhile, others who describe speech and press freedoms as natu-
ral rights typically view the First Amendment as a categorical ban on any federal 
restrictions of expression.41 
This Article, by contrast, presents an understanding of Founding Era expres-
sive freedom grounded on the interrelationship between common-law traditions 
and natural-rights principles. As a general matter, natural rights did not impose 
fixed limitations on governmental authority. Rather, Founding Era constitution-
alism allowed for restrictions of natural liberty to promote the public good—
generally defined as the good of the society as a whole.42 Recognition of natural 
rights, in other words, simply set the terms of political debate, not the outcomes. 
In this sense, speech and press freedoms were expansive in scope—applying to 
all forms of expression—but weak in their legal effect. And no evidence indicates 
that the First Amendment empowered judges to determine whether particular 
restrictions of speech promoted the general welfare.43 (Although perhaps 
strange to modern readers, this interpretation of the First Amendment—gener-
ally permitting the government to restrict speech in the public interest—survived 
into the early twentieth century.44) 
 
40. Hamburger’s only engagement with this issue is an unilluminating footnote: 
[N]atural law was not necessarily the only indication of what was an abridgement 
of the constitutional right, because a constitution might enumerate a natural right 
but qualify or supplement its protection of the right. The First Amendment right 
of free speech and press, for example, was understood to preclude publication cen-
sorship . . . . [T]his preference for postpublication restraints was highly compatible 
with the notion of a physical natural right, but it was not claimed to be derived 
from natural rights analysis. 
Id. at 954 n.130. In a similar vein, David Bogen shows that many Founders viewed the freedom 
of speech as a natural right, but he offers little account of what that meant. See Bogen, supra 
note 8, at 453 (“[N]atural rights theory . . . failed to mark the line between protected liberty 
and punishable license.”). Like Hamburger, Bogen does not explore the place of customary 
positive rights within a natural-rights framework. See id. at 450-53. 
41. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained” 
by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 278-79 (1992); see also LEVY, supra note 3, at 225 (“The 
Framers believed that . . . no provision of the Constitution authorized the government to act 
on any natural rights.”); cf. Heyman, supra note 3, at 1282 (classifying freedom of thought as 
a right “not subject to legislative regulation for the public good . . . [but] nevertheless limited 
by the rights of others”). For others who interpret the First Amendment as a categorical ban 
on federal regulations of expression, see supra note 36 (collecting sources). 
42. See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text. 
43. See infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (providing that the First Amendment 
prohibits prior restraints on speech but permits “the subsequent punishment of such [speech] 
as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare”). See generally Crowley v. Christensen, 137 
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Nonetheless, the Founders also accepted that speech and press freedoms de-
nied the government narrower slices of regulatory power. Everyone agreed, for 
instance, that the liberty of the press encompassed at least the common-law rule 
against press licensing. Americans also prized the right to a general verdict in 
sedition trials—enabling juries to decide questions of law and fact—and the right 
to present truth as a defense. Based largely on natural-rights principles, the 
Founders further rejected governmental authority to punish well-intentioned 
statements of one’s thoughts absent direct injury to others.45 But this principle 
did not extend to speech designed to mislead or harm others, nor is there evi-
dence that it offered protection for what we now call “expressive conduct.”46 In 
these limited ways, speech and press freedoms were narrow in scope but strong 
in their legal implications. And the legal dimensions of expressive freedom reveal 
how the Founders sometimes treated speech and press freedoms as distinct, with 
press freedom encompassing only the legal rights of printing-press operators. 
The claims made in the previous two paragraphs—developed further in 
Part II—simply describe a historical system of thought that Founding Era elites 
widely embraced. This Article does not attempt the impossible task of uncover-
ing how every American actually thought about expressive freedom. Conse-
quently, the discussion of “original meaning” in Part III aims to recover how 
Founding Era elites understood (where we have direct evidence), or would likely 
have understood (where we lack direct evidence), the Speech and Press Clauses 
of the First Amendment.47 But this Article has little to say about the views of 
 
U.S. 86, 89 (1890) (“[T]he possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reason-
able conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the 
safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community.”); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale 
of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental 
Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) (“Today, fundamental rights trump the general wel-
fare, whereas in 1905, under the police power of the state, the general welfare trumped 
rights.”). 
45. See, e.g., N.Y. Legislative Debates (Jan. 26, 1790), in N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1790, at 2 
(statement of Rep. Rufus King) (“The liberty of uttering our sentiments and giving publicity 
of our thoughts, might be supposed an evil were it not well guarded against by wholesome 
laws, which prevents any one man from injuring another.”). 
46. See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. 
47. Because of the evidence available, this Article relies on the views of Founding Era elites. Ref-
erences to the Founders, Americans, and so forth, should be read accordingly. Of course, this 
binary distinction between “elites” and “non-elites” is stylized. See Saul Cornell, Conflict, Con-
sensus & Constitutional Meaning: The Enduring Legacy of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 
383, 388 (2014). 
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Americans who were unfamiliar with the underlying principles of social-contract 
theory.48 
The interpretive relevance of my historical claims is therefore contingent. 
Scholars using some other methodology might propose an alternative under-
standing of the First Amendment as the correct meaning at the time of the Found-
ing.49 This Article cannot contest that claim because, as historical scholarship, it 
does not take any position on what made a constitutional interpretation “cor-
rect.”50 Rather, it argues that Founding Era elites widely embraced a particular 
system of thought and that this system of thought undergirded how those elites 
wrote and originally understood the First Amendment. 
B. Implications for Modern Doctrine 
Shi�ing from the perspective of a historian to that of a modern constitutional 
interpreter, however, it might be reasonable to assume that elite views suffice to 
show what now counts as an “original meaning.” A�er all, the historical evidence 
that scholars and judges routinely use in modern constitutional interpretation 
consistently reflects the perspectives of elites.51 
 
48. Although “large numbers of Americans spoke about government, liberty and constitutional 
law on the basis of some shared assumptions about natural rights and the state of nature,” 
Hamburger, supra note 3, at 915, these speakers may not be representative of the entire Found-
ing generation, see id. at 916. 
49. Perhaps those unfamiliar with natural-rights reasoning would have understood the term as 
the practical freedom that speakers and publishers exercised at the time of the First Amend-
ment’s ratification—a meaning that would prevent the government from instituting any new 
restrictions of speech or the press. Without evidence, one scholar posited this idea. See Leon-
ard W. Levy, The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (1985); cf. James Iredell’s Charge 
to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, CLAYPOOLE’S AM. DAILY 
ADVERTISER (Philadelphia), Apr. 11, 1799, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 332, 347 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 
1990) [hereina�er Iredell] (“What might be deemed the Freedom of the Press, if it had been 
a new subject, and never before in discussion, might indeed admit of some controversy.”). Or 
perhaps Americans unfamiliar with social-contract theory would have interpreted the First 
Amendment in light of the Speech and Debate Clause. Yet again, however, historical evidence 
does not support that view. See infra notes 275-281 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra Part IV. For this reason, this Article cannot refute interpretive arguments based on 
other methodologies. 
51. Readers may refer to any Supreme Court opinion that mentions history. To be sure, Justice 
Scalia once asserted that the Constitution’s original meaning “excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). But the Court never demonstrates 
that elite sources reflect how “ordinary citizens” would have understood the Constitution’s 
words and phrases, and it regularly relies on highly technical legal sources that were surely 
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So what relevance does this history have today? Most judges and constitu-
tional scholars think that Founding Era evidence does and should matter when 
interpreting the Constitution.52 On this assumption, accounting for the original 
meanings of speech and press freedoms would have profound consequences for 
First Amendment theory and doctrine. 
In terms of its consequences for theory, history undermines the notion that 
the First Amendment itself embraces a particular rationale for protecting expres-
sion. Such theories dominate modern debates.53 The meaning and scope of the 
First Amendment, scholars usually posit, depend on why the Constitution sin-
gles out speech and press freedoms.54 Some theories emphasize republican gov-
ernment,55 others the marketplace of ideas,56 and still more the autonomy of in-
dividuals.57 
Viewed historically, however, the First Amendment did not enshrine a par-
ticular rationale for expressive freedom. To be sure, the men who dra�ed and 
ratified the First Amendment had various reasons for why they valued expres-
sion.58 And when it came time to apply the Speech and Press Clauses, various 
 
unfamiliar to most ordinary citizens. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller 
and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 970 (2009) (offering an originalist perspective on 
the “public meaning” of terms of art). Of course, limiting the relevant public to voters might 
narrow the linguistic gap between the public and elites, see Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New 
Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 611-12 (2008), but that limitation is unwarranted if the 
relevant public includes non-voting members of the body politic. 
52. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 676 (1999); Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1409, 1415 (1990). 
53. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 nn. 6-8, 1768 (2004) (listing several 
theories). 
54. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 199 (1996) (“The First Amendment . . . cannot be applied to concrete cases except 
by assigning some overall point or purpose to the amendment’s abstract guarantee of ‘freedom 
of speech or of the press.’”). 
55. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 5; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH (1993); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 
(2016). 
56. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Eugene Vo-
lokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 
97 VA. L. REV. 595 (2011). 
57. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (describing 
the “one true value” of free speech as “individual self-realization”). 
58. In particular, many scholars have noted that preserving republican government was the pri-
mary objective for many proponents of speech and press freedoms. See Bhagwat, supra note 
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theories of expressive freedom could inform an assessment of the public good. 
But these theories were not themselves baked into the First Amendment. 
Recovering the history of expressive freedom also has potentially dramatic 
consequences for legal doctrine. Worth highlighting, yet again, is the “utter dif-
ferentness and discontinuity of the past.”59 Indeed, modern speech doctrine, 
which emerged in the twentieth century, bears almost no resemblance to eight-
eenth-century judicial decisions.60 And the Founders certainly did not envision 
courts cra�ing legal rules to prohibit speech-suppressing legislation that judges 
viewed as contrary to the public good.61 In that sense, modern doctrine is fun-
damentally inconsistent with Founding Era law. 
For originalists with a narrow conception of the judicial role,62 this variance 
either calls for a radical dismantling of speech doctrine, or it requires a conces-
sion that precedent has displaced original meaning.63 A huge swath of modern 
case law, a�er all, falls outside of the First Amendment’s original legal ambit, 
including its ban on prior restraints and its protection for well-intentioned state-
ments of one’s thoughts. If an originalist wanted First Amendment doctrine to 
track Founding Era judicial reasoning, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Texas v. 
 
55, at 1102 (“[A] broad consensus has emerged over the past half-century regarding the fun-
damental reason why the Constitution protects free speech: to advance democratic self-gov-
ernance.”). That account of the Founders’ motives is certainly true. But one goal of this Article 
is to show that the meanings of speech and press freedoms, as concepts, were not defined by 
or limited to concerns about preserving republican government. 
59. Gordon S. Wood, The Creative Imagination of Bernard Bailyn, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 16, 46 (James A. Henretta et 
al. eds., 1991). 
60. See G. Edward White, Intellectual History and Constitutional Decision Making, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1165, 1176-77 (2015). American judges, for instance, unanimously upheld sedition prosecu-
tions. See BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 145. For twentieth-century developments, see, for ex-
ample, Lakier, supra note 35; and G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The 
Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996). 
61. See infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text. 
62. See Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1777 
(2015); John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 843 (2016). 
63. Plenty of originalists value precedent. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2358-59 (2015); see also infra note 307 (collecting sources). 
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Johnson,64 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,65 Citizens United v. FEC,66 and Snyder v. 
Phelps,67 among many, many others, would likely have to go.68 
But other originalists argue that judges are empowered, or even duty-bound, 
to give concrete meaning to underdeterminate constitutional provisions.69 If one 
accepts this view, then modern law might still comport with original meaning. 
For instance, a natural-rights reading of the First Amendment would require the 
government to act for reasons that promote the public good, and modern doc-
trine can perhaps be understood, or justified, as prophylactic rules that help fer-
ret out illicit motives.70 To be sure, these judicial efforts bear little resemblance 
to anything that the Founders themselves would have endorsed. But they can 
still be seen as a way of implementing the original concepts of speech and press 
freedoms using modern doctrinal tools.71 And it is to those historical concepts 
that we now turn. 
i i .  natural rights at the founding 
When James Madison proposed constitutional amendments in 1789, he 
noted that his dra� included “natural rights, retained—as Speech, 
Con[science].”72 Indeed, eighteenth-century writers o�en identified speech as 
 
64. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
65. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
66. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
67. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
68. See infra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 132-49, 255-71 (rev. ed. 2014). This view is ahistorical, see Campbell, supra note 13, at 105-
08, but that does not make it “wrong.” Modern constitutional practice ultimately has to be 
based on normative grounds (or some other assessment of what counts as our law), which 
may call for only a limited form of historical inquiry. See Whittington, supra note 25, at 400-
04 (discussing the relationship between originalism and judicial review). 
70. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of 
Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 196-202 (1988). 
71. For different formulations of this two-step process of constitutional adjudication, see, for ex-
ample, Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); and Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
72. James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
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“a natural Right, which must have been reserved, when Men gave up their nat-
ural Rights for the Benefit of Society.”73 But what were natural rights? 
Section II.A explores the general eighteenth-century meaning of natural 
rights. In short, natural rights shaped how the Founders thought about the 
structure and purposes of government—ensuring that the government could re-
strain natural liberty only to promote the public good and only with the consent 
 
73. THOMAS HAYTER, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS CHIEFLY AS IT RESPECTS PERSONAL 
SLANDER 18 (London, J. Raymond 1755); see also FREEMAN’S J.: OR, THE NORTH-AM. INTELLI-
GENCER (Philadelphia), Nov. 16, 1785, at 3 (reprinting this passage); PA. PACKET (Philadel-
phia), Nov. 12, 1785, at 2 (same); VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), May 18, 1776, at 1 (same). For 
other sources that identify speaking, writing, and publishing as retained natural rights, see, 
for example, 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2,148 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis) (men-
tioning the “liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking, one’s thoughts, under the condition 
of being answerable to the injured party”); 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 918 (1794) (statement of Rep. 
William Giles) (referring to the “the inalienable privilege of thinking, of speaking, of writing, 
and of printing”); Congressional Debates (Jan. 21, 1791) (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames), in 
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 342 (William 
Charles DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995) (describing the freedom of speech as an “unalien-
able right”); id. at 340 (statement of Rep. John Vining) (“[N]o law can divest” individuals of 
the right “of speaking and writing their minds . . . .”); Proposal by [Roger] Sherman to House 
Committee of Eleven (July 21-28, 1789), in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DE-
BATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 83 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereina�er COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS] (“Speaking, writing and publishing” are among “certain natural rights which are 
retained”); Resolution of the Virginia House of Delegates, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER 
(Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at 2 (referring to the “natural right of speaking and writing freely”); 
2 JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LECTURES ON HISTORY, AND GENERAL POLICY 47 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 
1803) (“[I]n a state of society, every man retain[s] his natural powers of speaking, writing, 
and publishing his sentiments on all subjects . . . .”); Freeborn American, BOS. GAZETTE & 
COUNTRY J., Mar. 9, 1767, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 95, 
95 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1996) [hereina�er FREEDOM OF THE PRESS] (“Man, in a state of 
nature, has undoubtedly a right to speak and act without controul.”); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra 
note 14, at 676, 678 (1958) (“[R]ights which it is useless to surrender to the government” 
include “the rights of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing . . . .”); 
and Letter from Thomas Paine to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 4, 5 (1956) (“[N]atural rights” include “the rights of thinking, 
speaking, forming and giving opinions . . . .”). The understanding of speaking, writing, and 
publishing as natural rights was articulated in seminal discussions about speech and press 
freedoms during the Zenger controversy. See Argument of Andrew Hamilton, in FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS, supra, at 43, 54 (“I beg Leave to insist, That the Right of complaining or remon-
strating is natural; And the Restraint upon this natural Right is the Law only, and that those 
Restraints can only extend to what is false . . . .”); N.Y. WEEKLY J. (Nov. 1733), reprinted in 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra, at 30 (“No Nation Antient or Modern ever lost the Liberty of 
freely Speaking, Writing, or Publishing their Sentiments, but forthwith lost their Liberty in 
general and became Slaves.”). 
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of the people. But these “rights” (including the natural right of speaking, writ-
ing, and publishing) generally were not determinate legal privileges or immun-
ities. 
Since natural rights were subject to governmental regulation, we might won-
der why the Founders bothered amending the Constitution to include any of 
them.74 Indeed, some Federalists made exactly this argument when opposing an 
enumeration of rights. The purpose of declaring rights, John Jay explained, was 
to establish that “certain enumerated rights belonged to the people, and were not 
comprehended in the royal prerogative.”75 Under a republican government, 
however, all legislative power was exercised by elected representatives, thus ob-
viating any need to enumerate natural rights.76 Though puzzling today, Jay’s ar-
gument had considerable merit. Moreover, even among those who advocated for 
enumerating rights, many thought that declarations were hortatory, serving as a 
 
74. For instance, one scholar insists that confining regulations of expression to lawful restraints 
would have been “nothing but a tautology.” BIRD, supra note 3, at 11. But this reflects an anach-
ronistic view of freedom. Confining any restraints of natural liberty to known laws passed 
with the consent of the people and in pursuit of the public good was, according to many 
eighteenth-century thinkers, the very essence of freedom. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE AN-
CIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY 38-39 (2005); see, e.g., 
The Democratic Society of the City of New-York, to Their Brethren the Citizens of the United 
States (Jan. 14, 1795), in THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800: A DOCUMEN-
TARY SOURCEBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESSES, RESOLUTIONS, AND 
TOASTS 192, 195 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1976) [hereina�er DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIE-
TIES] (“CIVIL LIBERTY is the right of the citizen freely to dispose of his actions subject only to 
the restraint of the laws . . . . Restraint commences . . . where the liberty of one individual is 
incompatible with the safety, or happiness of another—it is dictated by justice, and constitutes 
law.”). 
75. See, e.g., A Citizen of New-York [John Jay], An Address to the People of the State of New York 
(Apr. 15, 1788), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 922, 933 
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004). 
76. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (July 24, 1788) (statement of James Iredell), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS 
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 10-11 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereina�er DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS]; THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); Remarker, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 
5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 527, 529-30 (John P. Kamin-
ski et al. eds., 1998); see also Gordon S. Wood, The History of Rights in Early America, in THE 
NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 233, 236-42 (Barry Alan Shain 
ed., 2007) [hereina�er THE NATURE OF RIGHTS] (describing the development of this view in 
England and America). 
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reminder, both to the people and to their government, of the reasons for 
instituting government and of the terms of the social contract and constitution.77 
Nonetheless, as Sections II.B and II.C demonstrate, the Founders o�en re-
ferred to certain rights, including speech and press freedoms, in a more legalistic 
way. Enumerated constitutional rights were “exceptions” to legislative authority, 
James Madison explained to Caleb Wallace in 1785.78 This would have been quite 
a strange comment if Madison were alluding to liberty that could be regulated 
to promote the public good. Others called for a bill of rights so that a “Check will 
be placed on the Exercise of . . . the powers granted.”79 Indeed, Thomas Jefferson 
claimed that enumerating rights would put a “legal check . . . into the hands of 
the judiciary,”80 even though American elites broadly agreed that judges had no 
business resolving cases based on judicial assessments of the general welfare.81 
In fact, speech and press freedoms had assumed greater determinacy in two 
respects. First, as explained in Section II.B, the Founders recognized an inalien-
able natural right to express one’s thoughts, sometimes described as the “free-
dom of opinion.” Second, as shown in Section II.C, American elites widely em-
braced an assortment of common-law rules, including a ban on press licensing, 
that offered more determinate legal protections for expressive freedom.82 In this 
 
77. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 69-70 (Murray Dry ed., 
1981); Jack N. Rakove, The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 
76, at 181, 193-94. 
78. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MAD-
ISON, supra note 72, at 350, 351 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
79. Letter from Samuel Chase to Richard Henry Lee (May 16, 1789), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 565, 565 (Charles Bangs Bickford et 
al. eds., 2004); see also The Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 23, 1788) (statement of Samuel 
Thompson), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1312, 1317 
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) (“[W]here is the bill of rights which shall check the power 
of this Congress, which shall say, thus far shall ye come and no farther.”). 
80. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 659, 659 (1958). 
81. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 107-08; see also infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text. 
82. Although not explored in this Article, other parts of the First Amendment also protected fun-
damental positive rights that furthered the natural right of expressive freedom. The ancient 
right to petition, for instance, was a procedural device through which individuals and groups 
could seek redress of grievances with accompanying “protect[ion] from formal political retal-
iation by governmental authorities.” Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History 
and Significance of the Right To Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2202 (1998). The right of 
peaceable assembly similarly barred prosecutions for peaceable public meetings, although its 
broader implications were contested. See Saul Cornell, “To Assemble Together for Their Common 
Good”: History, Ethnography, and the Original Meanings of the Rights of Assembly and Speech, 84 
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way, speech and press freedoms were legally distinct, with the latter referring 
only to the customary legal rules that protected printing-press operators. Finally, 
Section II.D concludes with a discussion of the contested relationship between 
natural rights, inalienable natural rights, and the common law. 
A. Natural Rights and Expressive Freedom 
The intellectual foundation of Founding Era constitutionalism was social-
contract theory.83 Essentially, the theory was a thought experiment designed to 
reveal the proper scope and distribution of political authority. It began by posit-
ing a world without government, commonly known as a “state of nature,” in 
which individuals had only “natural rights.” The theory then explored why peo-
ple in this condition would choose to organize politically.84 
Natural rights were any capacities that humans could rightly exercise on their 
own, without a government. (Positive rights, by contrast, were defined in terms 
of governmental action or inaction.) Consequently, natural rights encompassed 
nearly all human activities, sometimes summarized as a right to liberty or a “right 
to act.”85 More typically, however, natural-rights rhetoric developed around 
particular controversies. The natural rights to conscience and self-defense were 
part of the eighteenth-century lexicon, for instance, while other aspects of 
natural liberty, like eating and sleeping, were largely unmentioned.86 
Without recognizing this broader natural-rights discourse, scholars o�en 
view the freedom of speech as a term of art that originated with the legislative 
privilege of speech and debate,87 or they conclude that “freedom of 
 
FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 928-30 (2015); see also JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FOR-
GOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 21-29 (2012) (discussing the history of the freedom of assem-
bly in the Founding Era). 
83. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 87. 
84. Id. at 87-88. 
85. See, e.g., RONALD M. PETERS, JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL 
COMPACT 74-75 (1974); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 88-90 (1986); James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights 
of Individuals, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1053, 1055-56 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark 
David Hall eds., 2007).  
86. When Federalists came under fire for not enumerating rights, however, they mercilessly 
mocked their Anti-Federalist opponents by pointing out the limitless breadth of natural lib-
erty. See Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20-30 (1994). 
87. See infra notes 275-281 and accompanying text. 
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speech . . . had little history as an independent concept when the first amend-
ment was framed.”88 For the Founders, however, mentioning a “freedom to do 
something” naturally alluded to natural rights, without any need for further clar-
ification or consistent terminology.89 
Not surprisingly, then, the Founders invoked the natural right of expressive 
freedom in all sorts of ways. References to the freedom of speaking, writing, and 
publishing seem to have been the most common,90 probably because that phras-
ing appeared in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 and the Vermont Consti-
tution of 1777.91 In the committee that revised Madison’s proposed Bill of Rights, 
for instance, one dra� mentioned “certain natural rights which [we] retained,” 
including the right “of [s]peaking, writing and publishing . . . with decency and 
freedom.”92 But in the course of discussing natural rights, contemporaries also 
mentioned the “right to speak,”93 “[t]he right of publication,”94 “the natural right 
of free utterance,”95 the “liberty of discussion,”96 “the liberty of the tongue,”97 the 
“exercise of . . . communication,”98 and so forth. 
Eighteenth-century commentators sometimes referred to “the liberty of the 
press” as a natural right, too.99 “Printing,” a�er all, was “a more extensive and 
 
88. Anderson, supra note 6, at 487 (citing LEVY, supra note 34, at 5-6); accord Jay, supra note 6, at 
793; Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 17. 
89. See supra notes 14-15, 83-86 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra note 73 and infra notes 93-98 (collecting sources). 
91. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 12; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. 14. 
92. Proposal by Sherman to House Committee of Eleven, July 21-28, 1789, in COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 83. 
93. Freeborn American, supra note 73, at 95. 
94. ALEXANDER ADDISON, ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE VIRGINIA ASSEM-
BLY, ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF SUNDRY OF THE OTHER STATES IN ANSWER TO THEIR RESOLU-
TIONS 44 (Philadelphia, Zachariah Poulson Jr. 1800). 
95. JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 473 (Fredericksburg, Green & Cady 1814). 
96. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE 
MEANS OF MAKING IT A BENEFIT TO THE WORLD 21-22 (London, T. Cadell 1784). 
97. Eteocles, An Essay on the Freedom of Speech, MD. GAZETTE (Annapolis), Nov. 24, 1780, at 180. 
98. ADDISON, supra note 23, at 4. 
99. See, e.g., James Alexander, Letter to the Editor, PA. GAZETTE (Philadelphia), Nov. 24, 1737, 
reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 73, at 62, 66 (referencing “freedom of speech 
and liberty of the press” as “natural rights”). 
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improved Kind of Speech.”100 Some Founders distinguished the freedom of pub-
lishing, as a natural right, from the freedom of the press, as a common-law rule 
against press licensing.101 (In eighteenth-century English, “the press” was a 
reference to printing; the term did not refer to journalists until the nineteenth 
century.102) But the use of this terminology was fluid, and Founding Era discus-
sions of press freedom o�en alluded to natural-rights concepts.103 Some writers 
even equated “the Liberty of the Press” with “the Liberty of publishing our 
Thoughts in any Manner, whether by Speaking, Writing or Printing,” thus treat-
ing speech and press freedoms as synonymous.104 
Recognizing that expressive freedom was a natural right, however, is just the 
beginning. We also need to consider what that classification meant in terms of 
limits on governmental power. And that issue turned on two inquires: first, the 
scope of pre-political natural liberty, and, second, the extent to which individuals 
surrendered control of that liberty upon entering into a political society. As we 
will see, the Founders defined pre-political natural rights in two distinct ways, 
 
100. HAYTER, supra note 73, at 18; see also ADDISON, supra note 23, at 4 (“We communicate our 
sentiments by words spoken, written, or printed, or by pictures or other signs.”); WILLIAM 
BOLLAN, THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND WRITING UPON PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CONSIDERED 3-4 
(London, S. Baker 1766) (discussing “speech and writing, or printing, a species of writing 
invented for the more expeditious multiplication of copies, both being modes of presenting 
to the eye what speech conveys to the ear”). 
101. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2147-48 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis) (distinguishing “the 
liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking” from “the freedom of the press”). 
102. See 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 411 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d. ed. 
1989); see also JAMES SULLIVAN, DISSERTATION UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Boston, Joseph Nancrede 1801) (“The conventions of the 
states, and the Congress of the United States, use the word press as descriptive of the free 
communication of ideas and sentiments, by the art of printing.”). See generally Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012). 
103. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2167-68 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harper) (decrying the “licen-
tious abuse” of the liberty of the press, thus alluding to the natural-rights distinction between 
liberty and license—i.e., the abuse of liberty); NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCI-
PLES OF GOVERNMENT 152 (Rutland, Vt., J. Lyon 1793) (“Let there be no restraint upon the 
liberty of the Press, no check upon public or private discussion, but what is imposed by the 
manners, morals, taste, and good sense of the age.”). 
104. The Cra�sman No. 121, in 3 THE CRAFTSMAN 274, 274 (Caleb D’Anvers ed., London, R. 
Francklin 1731) (emphasis omitted); see American Intelligence, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadel-
phia), Jan. 5, 1789, at 3 (“Freedom of speech, which is nothing more than the freedom of press, 
is the great bulwark of liberty . . . .”). Other authors treated the freedom of speech as synony-
mous with “the liberty of individuals to communicate their thoughts to the public.” Of the 
Liberty of the Press and Elections, LONDON EVENING POST, Oct. 29, Nov. 9, Nov. 14, 1754, re-
printed in 16 SCOTS MAGAZINE 518-19 (1754). As this passage illustrates, “liberty” and “free-
dom” were typically used interchangeably. 
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but this difference ended up being of little practical significance because of a 
comparable divergence over how much natural liberty individuals surrendered 
when leaving the state of nature. 
In terms of the scope of natural rights, the Founders universally accepted that 
pre-political natural liberty was circumscribed by natural law.105 At a minimum, 
natural law required that individuals not interfere with the natural rights of oth-
ers.106 There was no natural right to assault others, for instance, because assault 
interfered with the natural right of personal security. Viewed in this way, natural 
rights could be roughly understood as human liberty to act unless those acts di-
rectly harmed others. 
But some Americans, informed by David Hume’s view that humans are in-
herently sociable,107 defined natural law in terms of social obligations, too. 
“Man, as a being, sociable by the laws of his nature,” Vermont jurist Nathaniel 
Chipman observed, “has no right to pursue his own interest, or happiness, to 
the exclusion of that of his fellow men.”108 James Wilson echoed this theme in 
his law lectures, explaining that natural law requires individuals to avoid injury, 
selfishness, and injustice.109 Thus, Wilson explained, every person can act “for 
the accomplishment of those purposes, in such a manner, and upon such objects, 
as his inclination and judgment shall direct; provided he does no injury to others; 
and provided some publick interests do not demand his labours. This right is natural 
liberty.”110 
At the next stage of social-contract theory, the Founders imagined that indi-
viduals—recognizing the deficiencies of a state of nature—would unanimously 
agree to form a political society (or body politic) under a social contract (or social 
compact).111 “The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of 
 
105. See Hamburger, supra note 3, at 922-30. 
106. See id. at 930. 
107. See DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in 2 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS 
287, 289-91 (London, A. Millar 1760); see also RUTHERFORD, supra note 15, at 10 (“It is there-
fore the law of [man’s] nature, that he should live in society with others of his own species” 
and “should join with them in a common interest . . . as to labour with them for a general 
good.”). 
108. CHIPMAN, supra note 103, at 75. 
109. Wilson, supra note 85, at 1056. 
110. Id. at 1055-56 (emphasis added). 
111. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 88; see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 
§§ 96-97 (1690), reprinted in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 142 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003); THEOPHILUS PARSONS, Essex Result, in MEMOIR OF 
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 366 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1861). Although typically cast in 
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individuals,” the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 characteristically declared, 
and “is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, 
and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws 
for the common good.”112 Creation of a body politic, the Founders imagined, 
then set the stage for another pact, the constitution, in which the people vested 
power in a government by majority consent.113 
Elites widely agreed about the essence of the social contract—namely, that 
the political society should protect natural liberty and should limit freedom only 
to promote the public good.114 And the Founders generally understood this con-
cept of the public good in an aggregate, collective sense, embracing the “safety 
 
historical terms, the social contract was a theoretical idea used to frame the relationship be-
tween individuals and their government. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 87 n.10, 89 n.19. 
112. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl. 
113. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 13, at 6; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *52; Madison, 
supra note 13, at 570. In English and colonial thought, this agreement was o�en described as 
an “original contract” between the people and the monarch. See REID, supra note 85, at 132-34. 
Founding Era writers sometimes merged the social contract and constitution. See PHILIP HAM-
BURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 98-99, 294 (2008); see, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 102, at 11 
(“In the social compacts, which we denominate constitutions . . . .”). This conflation was com-
mon in the United States a�er independence, see Thad W. Tate, The Social Contract in America, 
1774-1787: Revolutionary Theory as a Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375, 376 
(1965), likely because the notion of an “original contract” between the people and a monarch 
became obsolete. But American constitutional theorists maintained the distinction between a 
social contract and a constitution. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 13, at 6; Madison, supra note 13, 
at 570; see also 3 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 114 (1991) (“American Whigs, in contrast to later historians, seldom compound[ed] or 
confuse[d] the two contracts.”); REID, supra note 85, at 133-34 (noting eighteenth-century 
political writers’ distinctions between the social contract and the original contract). 
114. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 92-94; see, e.g., JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST 
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY 12-13 (2d ed., London, J. Johnson 1771) (“It must necessarily be understood, therefore, 
whether it be expressed or not, that all people live in society for their mutual advantage; so 
that the good and happiness of the members, that is the majority of the members of any state, 
is the great standard by which every thing relating to that state must finally be determined.”); 
JOHN WITHERSPOON, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN 
WITHERSPOON 191 (Thomas P. Miller ed., 1990) (“[I]t is certain that the public good has 
always been the real aim of the people in general in forming and entering into any society.”). 
When Jefferson recommended five works on “the organization of society into civil govern-
ment . . . according to the rights of nature,” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell 
(June 11, 1807), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 90, 90-91 (H. A. Washington ed., 
1853), all of his recommendations prioritized the public good. See CHIPMAN, supra note 103, at 
174-75 (noting that retained natural rights “must be in a just compromise with the convenience 
and happiness of others, agreeably to the laws of social nature, and such combinations and 
regulations, as are clearly derived from those laws”); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOV-
ERNMENT § 130 (1690), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE, supra note 111, at 156 (noting that individuals 
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and happiness of society,” as Madison put it.115 (A slew of interchangeable terms 
referred to the same idea, including “collective interest,” “common good,” “gen-
eral utility,” “general welfare,” “public interest,” and so forth.116) In the end, this 
framework prioritized the interests of the whole society over narrower private 
interests. The common good, the Founders repeatedly implored, o�en required 
individual sacrifices.117 At the same time, however, “respect for the public inter-
est meant that lawmakers had to consider everyone’s interests, and not merely 
those of particular individuals or factions.”118 
But while largely in agreement on substance, the Founders spoke in a con-
fusing assortment of ways about the retention of natural rights. The most com-
mon phrasing was, as William Blackstone put it, that “every man, when he enters 
into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty.”119 Meanwhile, others talked 
 
surrender “as much . . . natural Liberty . . . as the Good, Prosperity, and Safety of the Society 
shall require”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 297 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“[T]he safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions 
aim.”); PRIESTLEY, supra, at 57 (“[A]ll claims of individuals inconsistent with the public good 
are absolutely null and void.”); ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 
255 (2d ed., London, J. Darby 1704) (stating that “the publick Good . . . is the end of 
all . . . Government”) (emphasis added). 
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 114, at 297 (James Madison); see also supra note 114 and 
accompanying text (discussing the public good). 
116. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank, in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 13, at 91 (1965). 
117. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 114, at 239 (James Madison) (noting “the neces-
sity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good”); James Wilson, 
Of Citizens and Aliens, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 85, at 1038, 1043 
(“By the will and by the interest of the community, every private will and every private interest 
must be bound and overruled.”); see also Campbell, supra note 13, at 93 n.41 (collecting other 
sources). 
118. Campbell, supra note 13, at 94 (emphasis removed). 
119. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 (emphasis added); see also Hamburger, supra 
note 3, at 931 n.70 (collecting sources). 
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about it being “necessary to give up [natural] liberty” entirely,120 or at least nec-
essary to “surrender[] the power of controuling . . . natural alienable rights.”121 
Still more insisted that in forming a republic, “the people surrender nothing.”122 
This dizzying array of statements—that individuals retained some, all, or 
none of their natural liberty—has created an extraordinary amount of confusion 
among scholars.123 And it would seem to indicate substantial differences of opin-
ion among the Founders about the scope of their natural rights. In truth, how-
ever, the disagreement was semantic, not substantive, because competing views 
about the terms of the social contract mirrored the competing views about the 
scope of pre-political natural rights. 
For those who viewed natural rights as inherently circumscribed by a con-
cern for the general welfare, individuals could retain all of their natural liberty 
without creating any conflict with “the due exercise of the powers of govern-
ment, for the common good.”124 In 1816, for instance, Thomas Jefferson wrote 
that “the idea is quite unfounded, that on entering into society we give up any 
natural right.”125 But Jefferson clarified that these natural rights were limited not 
only by a prohibition on “commit[ing] aggression on the equal rights of an-
other” but also by “the natural duty of contributing to the necessities of the so-
ciety.”126 Consequently, by incorporating social duties into natural law, no con-
flict arose between the preservation of natural rights and the exercise of 
 
120. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 15 (New Haven, 
S. Converse 1822); see also New York Ratification Convention Debates (June 25, 1788) (state-
ment of Melancton Smith), in 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 
14, at 1877, 1879 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008) (“What is government itself, but a re-
straint upon the natural rights of the people?”). 
121. PARSONS, supra note 111, at 366 (emphasis added). 
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 114, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added); see 
also, e.g., Massachusetts Ratification Convention Debates (Jan. 23, 1788) (statement of The-
ophilus Parsons), in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1324 
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) (“[T]he people divest themselves of nothing.”). 
123. This confusion is most apparent in the view that natural rights were categorical exclusions of 
regulatory authority. See sources cited supra note 41. For an illuminating effort to trace and 
unravel much of the confusion, see Dan Edelstein, Early-Modern Rights Regimes: A Genealogy 
of Revolutionary Rights, 3 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 221 (2016). 
124. CHIPMAN, supra note 103, at 117. 
125. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis W. Gilmer (June 7, 1816), in 15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 23, 24 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905). 
126. Id. 
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governmental powers to promote the public good.127 “To give up the perfor-
mance of any action, which is forbidden by the laws of moral and social nature,” 
Nathaniel Chipman insisted, “cannot be deemed a sacrifice.”128 
This is not to say that natural rights were identically defined a�er the for-
mation of a political society. Some natural rights, Chipman explained, “to render 
them universally reciprocal in society, may be subjected to certain modifica-
tions.”129 Yet, these rights, he insisted, “can never justly be abridged,” meaning 
they could not “suffer any dim[i]nution.”130 This refrain was especially familiar 
with respect to property rights. Many people “consider property as a natural 
right,” James Wilson noted, but one that “may be extended or modified by pos-
itive institutions.”131 Accordingly, as Wilson explained: 
[B]y the municipal law, some things may be prohibited, which are not 
prohibited by the law of nature: but . . . every citizen will gain more lib-
erty than he can lose by these prohibitions . . . . Upon the whole, there-
fore, man’s natural liberty, instead of being abridged, may be increased 
and secured in a government, which is good and wise.132 
A natural right that could not be modified, by contrast, was an aspect of natural 
liberty over which the government simply had no authority.133 
 
127. For a discussion of how individuals could “retain” their natural rights in a social contract but 
consent to certain restrictions of those liberties under law, see Campbell, supra note 13, at 96-
98. 
128. CHIPMAN, supra note 103, at 74. 
129. Id. at 175 (emphasis added); see also SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) (“[W]e are not working 
on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those rights, modified by 
society . . . .” (quoting Nathaniel Chipman)). 
130. CHIPMAN, supra note 103, at 175 (emphasis added). 
131. James Wilson, On the History of Property, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 
85, at 387. 
132. Wilson, supra note 85, at 1056 (emphasis added). 
133. See ADDISON, supra note 94, at 46 (“[T]he liberty of conscience cannot be modified, and the 
liberty of the press cannot be abridged, by authority of the United States.”); Thomas Jeffer-
son, Jefferson’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Residence Bill (July 15, 1790), in 17 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 194, 195-97 (1965) (using the phrase 
“abridged or modified,” and treating “modified” as synonymous with “regulated in [its] exer-
cise by law”). In the late 1790s, some Republicans elided the inherent limits on expressive 
freedom imposed by natural law and social obligation, thus leading to the view that any reg-
ulation of expression was an abridgment of the freedom of speech. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1803), reprinted in VIEW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 91, 386 (1999). 
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For those who thought that individuals gave up some of their natural liberty 
in a social contract, however, retained natural liberty was still regulable so long 
as those regulations were in pursuit of the public good and made by a repre-
sentative legislature.134 As William Blackstone observed, natural liberty could be 
“so far restrained by human laws . . . as is necessary and expedient for the general 
advantage of the public.”135 Importantly, this framework did not endorse gov-
ernmental power to abridge retained natural rights. Rather, it simply recognized 
that individuals in a political society assumed certain reciprocal obligations that 
did not exist in a state of nature.136 Regard for the public good, in other words, 
was always implicit in the retention of natural rights. 
In sum, whether inherently limited by natural law or qualified by an imag-
ined social contract, retained natural rights were circumscribed by political au-
thority to pursue the general welfare. Decisions about the public good, however, 
were le� to the people and their representatives—not to judges—thus making 
natural rights more of a constitutional lodestar than a source of judicially en-
forceable law.137 Natural rights, in other words, dictated who could regulate nat-
ural liberty and why that liberty could be restricted, but they typically were not 
“rights” in the modern sense of being absolute or presumptive barriers to gov-
ernmental regulation. 
Speaking, writing, and publishing were thus ordinarily subject to restrictions 
under laws that promoted the public good. The principle that “Speech is a nat-
ural Right . . . reserved,” Thomas Hayter explained, was consistent with “the 
Power of Legislators, to restrain every impious, or immoral Abuse of speech” 
because “The principal End of every Legislature is the public Good.”138 Or, as 
another writer put it, the “right to speak and act without controul . . . is limited 
by the law—Political liberty consists in a freedom of speech and action, so far as 
the laws of a community will permit, and no farther.”139 
Consequently, even though the Founders broadly acknowledged that speak-
ing, writing, and publishing were among their natural rights, governmental lim-
itations of expressive freedom were commonplace. Blasphemy and profane 
 
134. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 92-98. 
135. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125. 
136. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 92-98. 
137. See infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text. 
138. HAYTER, supra note 73, at 8, 18. 
139. Freeborn American, supra note 73, at 95; see Tenax, To the People of Pennsylvania, THE FREEMAN’S 
JOURNAL: OR, THE NORTH-AMERICAN INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 30, 1782, at 1; William Livingston, 
Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, THE INDEP. REFLECTOR OR WKLY. ESSAYS ON SUNDRY 
IMPORTANT SUBJECTS, Aug. 30, 1753, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 73, at 75, 
79. 
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swearing, for instance, were thought to be harmful to society and were thus sub-
ject to governmental regulation even though they did not directly interfere with 
the rights of others.140 Some states even banned theater performances because 
of their morally corrupting influence.141 Although stated without qualification, 
and o�en viewed by modern interpreters as being unconditional,142 natural 
rights were always implicitly qualified, with the scope of their qualifications of-
ten turning on assessments of public policy. 
Yet while the Founders broadly agreed that governmental power should be 
defined and exercised only to promote the general welfare, they o�en disagreed 
passionately about the details. As Joseph Priestley noted, there was “a real diffi-
culty in determining what general rules, respecting the extent of the power of 
government, or of governors, are most conducive to the public good.”143 And 
nowhere was this difficulty more pronounced than the long-running controversy 
over sedition laws. 
 
140. See, e.g., Jacob Rush, The Nature of an Oath Stated and Explained, in CHARGES, AND EXTRACTS 
OF CHARGES, ON MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SUBJECTS 33, 44 (Philadelphia, 1804) (defending bans 
on profane swearing because it “lessen[s] that awe and reverence of the Supreme Being, which 
is one of the strongest guards against perjury; and consequently be in a high degree, injurious 
to society”). Others recognized that disrupting the “peace and order of society” was grounds 
for restricting publications, even without directly violating the rights of others. See Respublica 
v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 330 n.* (Pa. 1788); cf. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James 
Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 364, 367 
(1958) (endorsing restrictions of speech “affecting the peace of the confederacy with foreign 
nations”). Occasionally, writers worried that a general declaration of press freedom might be 
construed to “extend to the justification of every possible publication.” America [Noah Webster], 
To the Dissenting Members of the Late Convention of Pennsylvania, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 
31, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 484, 
487 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003); see also Hamburger, supra note 3, at 936 n.83; cf. N.Y. 
Legislative Debates (Jan. 26, 1790), in N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1790, at 2 (statement of 
Rep. Samuel Jones) (“[H]e hoped that something might be done, if it were possible, to dis-
criminate between the liberty and the licentiousness of the press. The amendment now pro-
posed would be nugatory, as something similar thereto was already included in the constitu-
tion. Unless it went a little farther, it appeared to him as if this amendment would not leave it 
in the power of the legislature to make any law even to punish the injuries that might be done 
to individuals by the indiscriminate publication of libels.”). But these sources do not indicate 
that existing legal privileges actually extended that far or that the Founders wanted to extend 
them that far. 
141. See HEATHER S. NATHANS, EARLY AMERICAN THEATRE FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THOMAS JEF-
FERSON: INTO THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE 37-70 (2003). 
142. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); BIRD, supra note 
3, at 27, 112, 461. 
143. PRIESTLEY, supra note 114, at 57. Priestley emphasized that this inquiry depended on empirical 
assessments, not purely abstract reasoning. Id. at 58. 
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Arguments for punishing sedition were straightforward. It was “necessary 
for the preservation of peace and good order,” Alexander Addison of Pennsylva-
nia explained, “to punish any dangerous or offensive writing, which, when pub-
lished, shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious ten-
dency.”144 Proponents of this view rejected the argument that narrowly tailored 
sedition laws would stifle useful criticisms of government and that counter-
speech was sufficient to prevent lasting harm.145 “It may be said, that an unre-
strained license to publish on the conduct of public men, would operate as a re-
straint upon [the government], and thus promote the public good,” Massachu-
setts Governor James Sullivan wrote, “but this is not true; an unrestrained 
license to publish slander against public officers, would . . . answer no possible 
valuable purpose to the community.”146 In fact, some argued that it was even 
more necessary to punish sedition in a republic. “In a Republican Government, 
where public opinion rules everything,” John Rutledge Jr. insisted during the 
Federalist effort to reauthorize the Sedition Act in 1801, “it is all-important that 
truth should be the basis of public information.”147 
Other eighteenth-century writers, however, argued that punishing sedition 
would, in the long run, harm the general welfare, even though sedition itself was 
deleterious. “The great object of society—that object for which alone govern-
ment itself has been instituted, is the general good,” Elizabeth Ryland Priestley 
wrote in 1800.148 Thus, she continued, “It may perhaps be urged, and plausibly 
urged, that the welfare of the community may sometimes, and in some cases, 
require certain restrictions on [an] unlimited right of enquiry: that publications 
exciting to insurrection or immorality for instance, ought to be checked or sup-
pressed.”149 Yet “ascertaining the proper boundary of such restrictions” would be 
vexing, she observed, and governmental power to regulate harmful speech, 
“once conceded, may be extended to every [opinion] which insidious despotism 
 
144. ADDISON, supra note 23, at 10. 
145. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 925 (1801) (statement of Rep. Samuel Dana) (“[T]hough upon 
general principles, truth may be said to be an antidote to falsehood, truth does not always 
make its appearance in time to prevent the evil intended by the evil-disposed.”). 
146. SULLIVAN, supra note 102, at 21-22. Sullivan, despite being a Republican, defended the consti-
tutionality of the Sedition Act. See id. 
147. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 931 (1801) (statement of Rep. John Rutledge Jr.); see, e.g., ADDISON, 
supra note 94, at 42-43. 
148. E[lizabeth] P[riestley], On the Propriety and Expediency of Unlimited Enquiry, in THOMAS 
COOPER, POLITICAL ESSAYS 62, 62 (Thomas Cooper ed., Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1800). For a brief 
introduction to this essay, see Eugene Volokh, Elizabeth Ryland Priestley, Early American Author 
on Free Speech, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 382 (2009). 
149. P[riestley], supra note 148, at 63. 
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may think fit to hold out as dangerous.”150 Moreover, as Republicans frequently 
argued, fear of being prosecuted might have a chilling effect on useful criticisms 
of government.151 
Notably, these arguments all relied on contingent judgments about public 
policy—not an understanding of natural rights that categorically permitted or 
barred governmental efforts to suppress expression, irrespective of the public 
good.152 Americans thus offered vastly different visions of how far expressive 
freedom should extend (due to differing calculations of what best furthered the 
public good) even while sharing the same conceptual understanding of speech 
and press freedoms. 
Further evidence of the Founders’ conceptual understanding of expressive 
freedom comes from their recognition of an equality between speech and press 
freedoms and, at the same time, their acceptance of distinct legal rules regarding 
oral and written statements. “The freedom of speech of writing and of printing 
are on equal grounds by the words of the constitution,” one commentator ob-
served in 1782, referring to the Pennsylvania constitution.153 As concepts, there-
fore, the freedoms of speaking, writing, and publishing were identical, allowing 
the government to punish only “the disseminating or making public of false-
hoods, or bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society.”154 Yet these equiv-
alent principles were perfectly consistent with broader liability and harsher pun-
ishment for written libels. “The reason,” the commentator explained, was that 
 
150. Id. at 63-64; see also, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 928 (1801) (statement of Rep. Benjamin Huger) 
(“[S]o nice and delicate were the shades of distinction between the licentiousness of the press, 
and a necessary freedom of discussion, that it was upon the whole better perhaps . . . to leave 
the measures of Government and its Administration entirely open to investigation and ani-
madversion, without attempting to repress the eccentricities and exuberances of public dis-
cussion by even an ideal restraint.”). 
151. See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 923 (1801) (statement of Rep. Joseph Nicholson). 
152. To be sure, the doctrinal conclusions that Republicans reached were o�en categorical, but their 
pre-doctrinal understandings of expressive freedom usually were not. See, e.g., GEORGE HAY, 
AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 27-28 (Richmond, Samuel Pleasants, Jr. 1803) (con-
cluding that publications on “matters of public concern” were immune from punishment be-
cause “the point at which freedom of enquiry ends and licentiousness begins, must remain 
forever unknown”). For a narrower interpretive argument that did take a categorical form, see 
infra Section II.B. Republicans in the late 1790s also wholly denied federal power over expres-
sion based on a novel interpretation of the First Amendment. See infra Section III.B; see also 
Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism (Sept. 10, 2017) (unpublished 
dra�) (on file with author). 
153. Tenax, supra note 139, at 1, 2. 
154. Id. Though unattributed, this language was drawn directly from Blackstone. See 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152 (“[T]he disseminating, or making public, of bad senti-
ments, destructive of the ends of society is the crime which society corrects.”). 
the yale law journal 127:246  2017 
280 
written statements were “more extended” and “more strongly fixed,” thus posing 
a greater threat to public order.155 In short, speech and press freedoms were 
equivalent, as natural rights, but the legal implications of these rights differed. 
B. Inalienable Natural Rights and the Freedom of Opinion 
Unlike ordinary natural rights, which were regulable to promote the public 
good, certain inalienable natural rights imposed more determinate constraints on 
legislative power.156 These rights, Nathaniel Chipman explained, were aspects 
of natural liberty that “can never justly be subject to civil regulations, or to the 
control of external power.”157 Some writers limited this category to the freedoms 
of conscience and thought158 without necessarily including a correlative liberty 
to exercise religion or to express thoughts.159 “Opinions are not the objects of 
legislation,” James Madison succinctly explained to his congressional colleagues 
in 1794.160 Few would have disagreed. But by the late eighteenth century,  
Americans widely embraced the idea that the government could not prohibit  
well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts, either. 
Opinions were sacrosanct because they were understood to be  
non-volitional.161 Unlike “Volition, or Willing,” John Locke explained, “in bare 
 
155. Tenax, supra note 139, at 2; see also, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 102, at 12 (drawing the same 
distinction between oral and written communication). 
156. Confusingly, the Founders sometimes referred to inalienable rights in an entirely different 
sense—namely, rights that could not be surrendered to the control of a monarch. See Camp-
bell, supra note 13, at 96-98. 
157. CHIPMAN, supra note 103, at 174. 
158. See N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. IV; PARSONS, supra note 111, at 366, 371; WITHERSPOON, 
supra note 114, at 405, 408; see also Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 245, 260 (1990); Barry A. Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the Declaration of 
Independence, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 116, 119. 
159. See An Eastern Layman, To The Publick, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), Aug. 14, 1779, at 1. 
160. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. James Madison); see also, e.g., Thomas 
Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 14, at 545, 546 (1950) (noting that “the opinions of men are not the object 
of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction”); Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder No. 7 (Dec. 
17, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 448, 
451 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983) (“Civil government has no business to meddle with 
the private opinions of the people.”); Resolutions Adopted Upholding Freedom of Speech, 
Writing, and Publishing, Dec. 17, 1794, reprinted in DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, su-
pra note 74, at 148, 148-49 (“[T]he freedom of opinion is a right inherent in nature, and never 
was intended to be surrendered to government.”). 
161. See, e.g., THOMAS COOPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIBEL, at ix-x, xxii-xxiii (1830); THOM-
SON, supra note 24, at 11, 13-14, 18-19. 
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naked Perception the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it per-
ceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.”162 Consequently, in Francis Hutcheson’s 
words, “the Right of private Judgment, or of our inward Sentiments, is unalien-
able; since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we our selves, or 
any other Person pleases.”163 Or, as Madison put it in his famous Memorial and 
Remonstrance, “the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contem-
plated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men.”164 The free-
dom of opinion was thus, at its core, a freedom against governmental efforts to 
punish people for their thoughts. (The Founding Era term “freedom of opinion” 
is thus somewhat misleading; the essence of the principle was protection for 
non-volitional thoughts.165) 
Americans o�en invoked the freedom to have opinions to defend a correlative 
freedom to express opinions.166 Among the natural rights that individuals had 
not surrendered to government, Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1789, were “the 
rights of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing.”167 The 
 
162. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 119 (A.D. Woozley ed., Me-
ridian Books 1969) (1690). 
163. FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND VIRTUE: 
IN TWO TREATISES 185 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Liberty Fund 2004) (1726). 
164. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, reprinted in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 72, at 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
165. The Founders thus referred interchangeably to the freedom to express “sentiments,” see, for 
example, PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. 1, § 12, and “thoughts and opinions,” PA. CONST. of 1790, 
art. IX, § 7. To the extent that statements of opinion received broader protection than state-
ments of fact, it was because of a duty to tell the truth. See RUTHERFORD, supra note 15, at 295 
(“[U]nlawful lyes [include] . . . not only such falshoods, as will directly injure a man, or hin-
der his innocent benefit; but all such falshoods likewise, as are inconsistent with that tacit 
consent to tell him the truth.”). 
166. See, e.g., THOMSON, supra note 24, at 11-12 (“[M]en should be allowed to express those 
thoughts, with the same freedom that they arise. In other words—speak, or publish, whatever 
you believe to be truth.”); Albert Gallatin, The Speech of Albert Gallatin, a Representative from 
the County of Fayette, in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, re-
printed in 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 1, 6 (Henry Adams ed., 1879) (“Whether the 
opinion be right or wrong, as long as it is only an opinion, everybody has a right to express 
it.”). Alexander Addison drew a distinction between thought and speech, but he also, following 
Blackstone, limited his endorsement of speech restrictions to “bad sentiments.” See ADDISON, 
supra note 23, at 10 (“[L]iberty of private sentiment is still le�; the disseminating or making 
public of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society cor-
rects.”). 
167. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 676, 678 (1958); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, 
at 131, 132 (noting “an universal and almost uncontroverted position in the several states, [is] 
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inalienability of this liberty was broadly recognized. All men had a right “of 
speaking and writing their minds—a right, of which no law can divest them,” 
Congressman John Vining observed in January 1791, before the First Amend-
ment was ratified.168 This right, Fisher Ames echoed in agreement, was “an un-
alienable right, which you cannot take from them, nor can they divest themselves 
of.”169 Any abridgment of that right, he insisted, would be “nugatory.”170 
The freedom to express thoughts, however, was limited to honest state-
ments—not efforts to deceive others. “The true liberty of the press is amply se-
cured by permitting every man to publish his opinions,” Pennsylvania jurist 
Thomas McKean explained in 1788, “but it is due to the peace and dignity of 
society to enquire into the motives of such publications, and to distinguish be-
tween those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to 
the public good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame.”171 
 
that the purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our [natural] rights”). Notably, 
Jefferson did not categorically reject governmental authority to punish malevolent expression. 
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 440, 442 (1956) (“A declaration that the federal govern-
ment will never restrain the presses from printing any thing they please, will not take away 
the liability of the printers for false facts printed.”). 
168. Congressional Debates (Jan. 21, 1791) (statement of Rep. John Vining), in 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 340 (William Charles DiGiaco-
mantonio et al. eds., 1995). This debate occurred before the First Amendment was formally 
ratified, but this fact evidently made little difference to the members of the First Congress. See 
also Congressional Debates (Feb. 11, 1790) (statement of Rep. Elias Boudinot), in 12 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 288 (Helen E. Veit et al. 
eds., 1994) (“[I]t has been so lately contended, and settled, that the people have a right to 
assemble and petition for redress of grievances.”). 
169. Congressional Debates (Jan. 21, 1791) (statement of Rep. Fisher Ames), in 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 342 (William Charles DiGiaco-
mantonio et al. eds., 1995). 
170. Id. Vining and Ames were opposing a proposal to prevent tax collectors “from interfering, 
either directly, or indirectly, in elections, further than giving their own votes, on penalty of 
forfeiting their offices.” Id. at 339 (statement of Rep. James Jackson). Some representatives 
enthusiastically supported the proposal, suggesting that it ought to be applied to other gov-
ernmental officials, see id. at 340-41 (statement of Rep. Elbridge Gerry); id. at 341 (statement 
of Rep. John Laurance); id. at 342 (statement of Rep. Roger Sherman), thus protecting “the 
freedom of elections” from official interference, id. at 341 (statement of Rep. Michael Stone). 
The law did not prohibit speech, some proponents of the bill noted, because it merely placed 
a condition on office holding, see, e.g., id. at 340 (statement of Rep. Egbert Benson), although 
Roger Sherman advocated a broader ban on “the arts of electioneering,” id. at 339-40 (state-
ment of Rep. Roger Sherman). The House ended up rejecting the measure. 
171. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788); see also ADDISON, supra note 94, at 
50 (“If a man willfully, maliciously, and with intent to defame, publish an opinion not sup-
ported by fact, it is an offense.”); James Wilson, Of the Nature of Crimes; and the Necessity and 
natural rights and the first amendment 
283 
For that reason, this Article o�en refers to a “freedom to make well-intentioned 
statements of one’s thoughts.” The Founders, immersed in their own constitu-
tional language, hardly needed such a periphrastic term; they could simply in-
voke the “freedom of opinion” or “freedom of speech.” 
Sedition laws were thus facially consistent with the freedom of opinion when 
confined to false and malicious speech. “Because the Constitution guaranties the 
right of expressing our opinions, and the freedom of the press,” Federalist John 
Allen asked rhetorically during the congressional debates over the Sedition Act, 
“am I at liberty to falsely call you a thief, a murderer, an atheist?”172 Answering 
his own question, and again treating the First Amendment as guaranteeing “the 
liberty of opinion and freedom of the press,”173 Allen implored that “[t]he free-
dom of the press and opinions was never understood to give the right of pub-
lishing falsehoods and slanders, nor of exciting sedition, insurrection, and 
slaughter, with impunity. A man was always answerable for the malicious pub-
lication of falsehood; and what more does this bill require?”174 Over and over, 
Federalists emphasized the requirement of “a false and malicious intention.”175 
Opponents of the Adams Administration saw through the Federalist cha-
rade, viewing the Sedition Act as part of “a legislative program designed to crip-
ple, if not destroy, the Republican Party.”176 Frequent complaints that Federalists 
had “countenance[d] a punishment, for mere freedom of opinion,” thus appear 
 
Proportion of Punishments, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 85, at 1087, 
1090 (“The law of nature, it is admitted on all hands, measures crimes by the intention, and 
not by the event.”); Extract from a Charge . . . by the Honorable Thomas M’Kean, Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, with the unanimous approbation of the other Judges, in PA. PACKET (Philadel-
phia), Apr. 19, 1785, at 3 (“Men therefore have only to take care in their publications, that they 
are decent, candid and true, that they are for the purpose of reformation and not of defama-
tion, and that they have an eye solely to the public good.”). 
172. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2097 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Allen). 
173. Id. at 2098; see also id. (mentioning “liberty of the press and of opinion”). 
174. Id. 
175. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 917 (1801) (statement of Rep. Jonas Platt); see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 5-
110, at 183 (1799); ADDISON, supra note 94, at 50; Iredell, supra note 49, at 348. 
176. Stone, supra note 9, at 16. This point is widely recognized, though any effort to appreciate 
Federalist motives must at least grapple with the ongoing tumult in France. See Kathryn 
Preyer, United States v. Callender: Judge and Jury in a Republican Society, in ORIGINS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 173, 187 (Maeva Marcus ed., 
1992) (“Only present-mindedness or lack of imagination leads us to dismiss casually [Feder-
alist] fears as paranoia.”). The Federalist effort to reauthorize the Sedition Act in 1801 further 
complicates this standard historical account. For a penetrating review of Federalist thought, 
see Lendler, supra note 35, at 419-25. 
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justified.177 Yet in their more contemplative moments, some Republicans recog-
nized that the Sedition Act itself fell short of abridging the freedom of opinion. 
If the law were perfectly administered, one Virginia editorial noted, “No per-
son  . . . would be the subjects of ruin under this statute, unless they annexed to 
those opinions a design that was not pure.”178 Or, as libertarian writer John 
Thomson acknowledged, if prosecutions “were not for the publication of opinions, 
then the Constitution has not been violated by them.”179 
Also notable about the Sedition Act controversy, however, was the nearly 
universal acknowledgment by Federalists that well-intentioned statements of 
opinion, including criticisms of government, were constitutionally shielded.180 
“[I]t is well known,” Alexander Addison remarked, “that, as by the common law 
of England, so by the common law of America, and by the Sedition act, every 
individual is at liberty to expose, in the strongest terms, consistent with decency 
and truth all the errors of any department of the government.”181 Federalists, in 
other words, firmly rejected the long-discredited rule that “no private man can 
take upon him[self] to write concerning the government at all.”182 By limiting 
 
177. THE DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ADOPTED BY 
SAID HOUSE, DECEMBER, 1798, at 4 (Philadelphia, 1799). 
178. The Independant (Dec. 11, 1798), TIMES & ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1798; see also 10 
ANNALS OF CONG. 922 (1801) (statement of Rep. Joseph Nicholson) (“It was and might be 
further urged, that the act was only aimed at false and malicious libels, tending to defame the 
Government. He granted it; but who were to be the judges?”). 
179. THOMSON, supra note 24, at 25. Later, Thomson made a broader argument against regulations 
of expression. See id. at 81-84; see also, e.g., JOHN PAGE, AN ADDRESS TO THE FREEHOLDERS OF 
GLOUCESTER COUNTY 15 (Richmond, John Dixon 1799) (describing the Sedition Act as “un-
just as well as unconstitutional” because it applied to those who criticized the government “pat-
riotically, and conscientiously, and constitutionally”). 
180. To be sure, Federalists generally preferred deferential rather than populist politics, and they 
abhorred the Democratic-Republican societies in the mid-1790s that claimed to speak on be-
half of the people. But contrary to some portrayals, see James P. Martin, When Repression Is 
Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 134-35 (1999), these ideas did not come close to a view that individuals 
could or should be barred from discussing public affairs or criticizing the government in good 
faith, see RICHARD BUEL JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 
1789-1815, at 93-112, 128-35, 244-61 (1972); Richard Buel Jr., Freedom of the Press in Revolution-
ary America: The Evolution of Libertarianism, 1760-1820, in THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REV-
OLUTION 59, 89 (Bernard Bailyn & John B. Hench eds., 1981). 
181. ADDISON, supra note 94, at 42; see also 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 933 (1801) (statement of Rep. John 
Rutledge, Jr.) (“[E]very man has the privilege of expressing unreservedly whatever he thinks 
on political subjects.”). 
182. The Trial of the Seven Bishops (1688) (opinion of Richard Allibond), in 12 A COMPLETE COL-
LECTION OF STATE TRIALS 183, 428 (London, T.B. Howell ed., 1816). For English statements 
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the Sedition Act to false and malicious statements, and by providing a truth de-
fense,183 Federalists could reasonably claim fidelity to this longstanding respect 
for the freedom of opinion. Indeed, Federalists sought to renew the Sedition Act 
in January 1801—with a new administration poised to take the helm—because 
 
against this view, see, for example, JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, 
OR AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 280 (London, T. Spilsbury 1775) (“[T]he 
English constitution . . . has allotted to the people themselves the province of openly canvass-
ing and arraigning the conduct of those who are invested with any branch of public authority; 
and . . . has thus delivered into the hands of the People at large, the exercise of the Censorial 
power.”); and [Thomas Gordon], Letter No. 15 (Feb. 4, 1720), in 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & 
THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS: OR, ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND 
OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 110, 111 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995) (“That men ought to speak 
well of their governors, is true, while their governors deserve to be well spoken of; but to do 
publick mischief, without hearing of it, is only the prerogative and felicity of tyranny: A free 
people will be shewing that they are so, by their freedom of speech.”). For similar statements 
by Supreme Court justices, see John Blair’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the 
District of Delaware (Oct. 27, 1794), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 49, at 485, 489 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) 
(“[W]hile men pay an external obedience to the laws, they have a right to think of them as 
they please, and even beyond this, to express their opinion decently, yet strongly, as a mean 
of obtaining an alteration . . . .”); Dra� of John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court 
for the District of Virginia (before Apr. 22, 1793), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 49, at 359, 364 (Maeva Marcus et al. 
eds., 1990) (“As free Citizens we have a Right to think and speake our Sentiments . . . in 
Terms . . . explicit plain and decorous.”); and Wilson, supra note 85, at 1046 (stating that every 
“citizen under a free government has a right to think, to speak, to write, to print, and to pub-
lish freely, but with decency and truth, concerning publick men, publick bodies, and publick 
measures”). An enormous literature addresses the political controversies in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries from which this freedom emerged. See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 8, at 
442-44, 446; Mayton, supra note 8, at 102-08; Michael E. Stevens, Legislative Privilege in Post-
Revolutionary South Carolina, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 71, 71-73 (1989). See generally FREDRICK SEA-
TON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF GOV-
ERNMENT CONTROLS (1952). 
183. For earlier discussions of the truth defense, see, for example, Letter from John Adams to Wil-
liam Cushing (Mar. 7, 1789), in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 73, at 152, 153; Letter from 
John Marshall to Archibald Stuart (May 28, 1794), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 267, 
268 (Charles T. Cullen & Herbert A. Johnson eds., 1977). For a discussion of a famous con-
troversy in New York over the truth defense, see Kate Elizabeth Brown, Rethinking People v. 
Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the Nature and Scope of “Common Law” in the Early Republic, 
32 L. & HIST. REV. 611 (2014). Some judges thought that “a defendant could establish the truth 
of the publication only to show that he lacked the requisite malicious intent.” David Jenkins, 
The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel into First Amendment Jurispru-
dence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 192 (2001); see, e.g., id. at 198-99 (describing the views of 
James Kent and Joseph Story). 
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the Act, in their view, had “enlarged instead of abridg[ed] the ‘liberty of the 
press.’”184 
Scholars, however, routinely overlook Federalist support for expressive free-
dom. Defenders of the Sedition Act, one author writes, equated “the freedom of 
speech and press” with an understanding that “government could restrain 
speech post-publication or post-utterance in whatever way it pleased.”185 In fact, 
not a single Federalist in Congress took that view. To be sure, many Federalists 
interpreted the freedom of the press as simply a rule against prior restraints—an 
idea that we will turn to next.186 But the First Amendment, as Federalist Harri-
son Gray Otis explained, also guaranteed “the liberty of writing, publishing, and 
speaking, one’s thoughts, under the condition of being answerable to the injured 
party, whether it be the Government or an individual, for false, malicious, and 
seditious expressions, whether spoken or written.”187 This was a qualified liberty, 
of course, and perhaps inadequate when executed by a partisan administration 
and partisan judiciary. But Federalists widely accepted the freedom of opinion, 
even in the late 1790s. 
Readers may be curious about the scope of the freedom to make well-inten-
tioned statements of one’s thoughts—whether, for instance, it applied to certain 
forms of expressive conduct like flag burning or political donations. Historical 
evidence offers no clarion answers, but the principles of social-contract theory 
frame the inquiry in a way that disfavors categorical protection for expressive 
conduct. To be sure, engaging in expressive behavior was an innate human ca-
pacity, so it was properly understood as falling within the natural right of ex-
pressive freedom.188 But there was little basis for recognizing an inalienable nat-
ural right of expressive conduct. The scope of inalienable rights, a�er all, 
 
184. H.R. REP. NO. 5-110, at 183 (1799); see 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 920-21 (1801) (statement of Rep. 
Roger Griswold). Notably, some Federalists in January 1801 still held out hope that the pres-
idential election would eventually swing their way a�er an impending deadlock between Jef-
ferson and Burr. See JAMES ROGER SHARP, THE DEADLOCKED ELECTION OF 1800: JEFFERSON, 
BURR, AND THE UNION IN THE BALANCE 139-41 (2010). 
185. Lakier, supra note 35, at 2180; see sources cited supra note 35. The few scholars who have noted 
possible differences between speech and press rights either have yet to illuminate their rela-
tionship, see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6, at 490 & n.211, or have insisted that the freedom of 
speech was derived from the legislative privilege of speech and debate, see sources cited supra 
note 4. 
186. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2148 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis) (“[T]he 
liberty of the press is merely an exemption from all previous restraints.”). 
187. Id. 
188. See, e.g., ADDISON, supra note 23, at 4 (“We communicate our sentiments by words spoken, 
written or printed, or by pictures or other signs.”); see also Volokh, supra note 3, at 1059 (“The 
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depended on whether individuals were physically capable of parting with certain 
aspects of natural liberty and, if so, whether collective control of that liberty 
would serve the public good.189 Some expressive conduct, like instinctive smiles, 
surely fell on the side of inalienability. But when expressive conduct caused harm 
and governmental power to restrict that conduct served the public good, there is 
no reason to think that the freedom of opinion nonetheless immunized that con-
duct. 
Consequently, although the freedom of opinion was fixed in some respects—
allowing individuals to criticize the government in good faith, for instance—de-
termining its scope called for the same policy-driven analysis that characterized 
the Founders’ general approach to natural rights. In short, outside of the core 
protection for well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts, the boundaries of 
the freedom of opinion depended on political rather than judicial judgments. 
C. Common-Law Rights and the Freedom of the Press 
In addition to inalienable natural rights, state declarations of rights in the 
1770s and 1780s also included numerous fundamental positive rights, like the 
right to trial by jury and the rule against ex post facto laws. Unlike “natural lib-
erty . . . retain[ed],” one Anti-Federalist noted, fundamental positive rights were 
 
equivalence of symbolic expression and verbal expression is consistent with the First Amend-
ment’s original meaning.”). The fact that expressive and non-expressive aspects of natural lib-
erty were both subject to regulation in the promotion of the public good negated the need for 
a distinction between “speech” and “conduct.” Cf. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—
Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. 
L.J. 899, 902-03 (1979) (“In order that the first amendment be applied effectively to carve out 
a category of activity for special protection, consideration must be given to the meaning of the 
word ‘speech’ . . . .”). Some Founders denounced theater bans, for instance, as obstructing 
“the natural right of every freeman to dispose of his time and money, according to his own 
taste and disposition, when not obnoxious to the real interests of society,” without any men-
tion of the expressiveness of theater performance. To the Honorable the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania, the Subscribers Being a Committee of the Dramatic Association . . . , PA. PACKET 
(Philadelphia), Feb. 17, 1789, at 3. Moreover, theater supporters emphasized the permissibility 
of governmental regulation to promote the public good. See, e.g., Arguments in Favour of the 
Drama, PA. PACKET (Philadelphia), Feb. 17, 1789, at 3 (removing a ban on theater would still 
permit theaters to “be regulated,” because “every thing that has an immoral tendensy should 
be prohibited;—every exceptionable play, now extant, should be altered, or rejected, and none 
but those that have the good of mankind for their object, should be acted”). For an analysis 
of mid-1790s controversies about raising liberty poles, see Cornell, supra note 82, at 922-32. 
189. See, e.g., HUTCHESON, supra note 163, at 185 (asking “[i]f the Alienation be within our natural 
Power” and whether it “may serve some valuable Purpose”). 
the yale law journal 127:246  2017 
288 
“particular engagements of protection, on the part of government.”190 These 
were rights defined in relation to governmental authority. And what made them 
“fundamental” was an acceptance of their inviolability, usually based on their 
recognition in the social contract or constitution.191 In short, these rights were, 
as Thomas Jefferson explained in 1790, “certain fences which experience has 
proved particularly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right.”192 
Interestingly, Jefferson classified the freedom of the press as a fundamental pos-
itive right.193 
Scholars typically assert that the freedom of speech and the freedom of the 
press were equivalent,194 and, as we have seen, those concepts were equivalent 
as natural rights.195 Yet in the context of enumerated bills of rights, discerning 
the meanings of these freedoms is more complicated and reveals an important 
difference between speech and press freedoms.196 The Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion of 1776, for instance, separated the “right to freedom of speech, and of 
 
190. An Old Whig IV, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), Oct. 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 497, 501 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1981). Benjamin Rush lamented that combination, writing in 1777 that Penn-
sylvania’s “Bill of Rights has confounded natural and civil rights in such a manner as to pro-
duce endless confusion in society.” Benjamin Rush, Observations upon the Present Govern-
ment of Pennsylvania, in FOUR LETTERS TO THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA 3 (Philadelphia, 
Styner & Cist 1777). 
191. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 99. 
192. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 132. 
193. Id. (listing “trial by jury, Habeas corpus laws, free presses” as positive rights); see also Federal 
Farmer No. 6 (Dec. 25, 1787), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 
14, at 979, 983-84 (2004) (distinguishing natural rights from “constitutional or fundamental” 
rights); Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION, supra note 14, at 1051, 1059 (2004) (describing press freedom as a “fundamental 
right”). But see Heyman, supra note 3, at 1289 (citing Federal Farmer for the idea that press 
freedom is a natural right); McAffee, supra note 41, at 278-79 (same). 
194. See sources cited supra note 3. 
195. See supra Part II. 
196. The Founders also o�en mentioned the freedom of the press as an obligation of printers to 
publish all items “conducive of general Utility,” without discrimination among writers. Liv-
ingston, supra note 139, at 81. See generally ROBERT W. T. MARTIN, THE FREE AND OPEN PRESS: 
THE FOUNDING OF DEMOCRATIC PRESS LIBERTY, 1640-1800 (2001) (presenting a scholarly ac-
count of the development of the concept of the free press). This usage was prevalent, but it 
related to the public norms applicable to printers, not limitations on governmental power, 
and it seems to have had no direct relationship to original understandings of the First Amend-
ment. 
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writing, and publishing” from “the freedom of the press.”197 That split strongly 
suggests a distinction in meaning. And Jefferson’s letter suggests an intriguing 
explanation: the term “freedom of the press” could denote a particular funda-
mental positive right. 
The content of this right was widely known. “The liberty of the press,” 
William Blackstone had famously declared, “consists in laying no previous 
restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal 
matter when published.”198 And without a governmental censor, local juries ra-
ther than royal agents controlled how far publishing could be restricted. “The 
liberty of the press, as established in England,” Jean Louis de Lolme wrote in 
1775, effectively meant that courts considering libels against printers “must . . . 
proceed by the Trial by Jury.”199 
Americans, and particularly those with legal training, frequently echoed 
these ideas. “[W]hat is meant by the liberty of the press,” James Wilson observed 
during the 1787 ratification debates, “is, that there should be no antecedent 
restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the 
security or welfare of the government or the safety, character, and property of 
the individual.”200 Others mentioned the importance of empowering juries to 
 
197. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 12 (“[T]he people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, 
and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be re-
strained.”); see also COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 93 (presenting similar pro-
posals of North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, and the Pennsylvania minority). For a his-
tory of this provision, see Smith, supra note 8, at 58-63. Scholars have elided the distinct 
meanings of these clauses. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 3, at 204; Volokh, supra note 3, at 1080-
81. Other states opted for a simple declaration in favor of the liberty of the press. See Anderson, 
supra note 6, at 464-65, 538-41. Vermont, which had asserted its independence from New 
York, was the only other state to invoke the freedom of speech in its constitution. See VT. 
CONST. of 1786; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, § 14. For John Adams’s earlier proposal of a nearly 
identical provision, see John Adams, The Report of a Constitution or Form of Government 
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Sept. 1, 1779), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 219, 227 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851) 
(“The people have a right to the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing their senti-
ments. The liberty of the press, therefore, ought not to be restrained.”). For a brief history of 
this proposal, see CLYDE AUGUSTUS DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
IN MASSACHUSETTS 133-36 (1906). 
198. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151, *152. Notably, Blackstone assumed that “the 
object of legal punishment” was harmful speech, “destructive of the ends of society.” Id. at 
*153. 
199. DE LOLME, supra note 182, at 283. Sedition was originally tried in the Star Chamber, without 
common-law procedural rights. See Mayton, supra note 8, at 105. 
200. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (statement of James Wilson), in 
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 455 (Merrill Jensen ed., 
1976); see also, e.g., [Hugh Williamson], Speech at Edenton, N.C., N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER (Feb. 
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determine the proper bounds of expressive freedom. “[S]hould I be unjustly 
accused of [sedition],” Virginia lawyer Alexander White remarked, “the trial by 
a jury of my countrymen is my security—if what I have said or wrote corresponds 
with their general sense of the subject, I shall be acquitted.”201 
In sum, although many of the Founders discussed press freedom as a natural 
right, it also had a readily available meaning as a fundamental positive right against 
press licensing, thus empowering juries to determine the proper scope of expres-
sive freedom. 
D. Nature and Law 
The notion that speech and press freedoms referred to natural rights, inal-
ienable natural rights, and fundamental positive rights may appear confused or 
even contradictory. In the eighteenth century, however, these rights were closely 
intertwined.202 The fundamental positive rights embodied in common law in-
formed understandings of natural rights, and vice versa. 
The common law did not directly recognize natural rights as a set of positive 
rights. Natural rights, a�er all, were simply the liberty that humans would enjoy 
in a state of nature, bounded by the dictates of natural law. In contrast to positive 
rights, they were not defined in terms of governmental action or inaction. When 
a constitution protected certain natural rights against abridgment, however, it 
became important to determine the scope of retained natural liberty. And to as-
sist with this task, the Founders naturally turned to positive law, and particularly 
the common law. 
 
25, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 201, 202 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (equating freedom of the press with freedom 
from “the restraint of any license”); N.Y. Legislative Debates (Jan. 26, 1790), in N.Y. DAILY 
GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 1790, at 2 (statement of Rep. Rufus King) (same). 
201. To the Citizens of Virginia, WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788, reprinted in 8 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 404-05 (1988); cf. Letter from John Ad-
ams to William Cushing (Mar. 7, 1789), in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 73, at 152, 153 
(“[I]f the jury found [the putatively libellous statements] true and that they were published 
for the Public good, they would readily acquit.”); Cincinnatus I: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. 
J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 
160, 163 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003) (warning that without a jury the government 
“will easily find pretexts” to restrain “what it may please them to call—the licentiousness of 
the press”). 
202. See, e.g., Meyler, supra note 18, at 581. 
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The common law was probative, in part, because it helped define the natural-
law boundaries of natural rights.203 Natural law, we must recall, was not a finely 
tuned set of legal rules. Rather, it embodied the dictates of reason and justice. 
“We discover it,” James Wilson explained, “by our conscience, by our reason, 
and by the Holy Scriptures.”204 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Founders recog-
nized considerable underdeterminacy about what natural law required.205 
“[W]hoever expects to find, in [reason, conscience, and the Holy Scriptures], 
particular directions for every moral doubt which arises,” Wilson cautioned, “ex-
pects more than he will find.”206 
In day-to-day practice, then, natural law itself provided little guidance about 
how to resolve difficult legal questions. Instead, lawyers and judges used a sys-
tem of customary legal rules known as the common law. Yet the legal system 
operated on the assumption—or at least the fiction—that the common law and 
natural law were in harmony.207 “The common law,” Alexander Addison charac-
teristically observed, “is founded on the law of nature and the revelation of 
God.”208 Consequently, the common law could help determine the proper 
boundaries of natural liberty. Governmental powers recognized at common law 
were presumptively acceptable, while common-law limits on those powers (such 
as the rule against prior restraints) recognized presumptively unjustified abridg-
ments of natural rights. 
Moreover, for those who viewed social obligations as stemming from com-
mon consent rather than from natural law, the common law helped delineate the 
scope of those obligations. The common law, a�er all, had the presumptive con-
sent of the people over an extended period. “[L]ong and uniform custom,” Eng-
lish jurist Richard Wooddeson explained, “bestows a sanction, as evidence of 
 
203. See Hamburger, supra note 3, at 954. Inalienable natural rights, just like alienable natural 
rights, were circumscribed by natural law. Id. at 931-32, 954. 
204. Wilson, supra note 131, at 509. 
205. Id. at 514-18. 
206. Id. at 522. 
207. See R. H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN PRACTICE 97-
98 (2015). 
208. ADDISON, supra note 94, at 29; see HELMHOLZ, supra note 207, at 96 (mentioning English in-
vocations of this idea); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental 
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 854 (1978) (describing the cus-
tom of the common law as “the most reliable evidence of the content of natural law”); see also 
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
5, 39-40 (2001) (noting that natural rights required political recognition before entering the 
customary constitution). 
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universal approbation and acquiescence.”209 Though certainly not immune to 
change,210 the common law at least presumptively comported with the reciprocal 
obligations that individuals had assumed in the social contract. In short, custom-
ary positive law helped reveal the proper scope of natural liberty. 
At the same time, Americans sometimes used natural-law reasoning to shape 
their understanding of positive law. This approach reflected the prevalent view 
that positive law should reflect and conform to natural law. “[M]unicipal laws 
are under the control of the law of nature,” Wilson noted in his law lectures, 
meaning that natural law was superior to positive law.211 Because of its under-
determinacy, natural-law reasoning was typically reserved within legal circles for 
resolving ambiguities in the common law or statutory law; judicial assessments 
of natural justice could not displace positive law.212 Among the laity, however, 
the priority of natural law sometimes prompted calls for an abandonment of le-
gal pedantry. “It is our business to do justice between the parties,” John Dudley 
of New Hampshire opined about the jury’s role, “not by any quirks of the law 
 
209. WOODDESON, supra note 13, at 28; see, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74 (ob-
serving that the common law “probably was introduced by the voluntary consent of the peo-
ple”); SULLIVAN, supra note 102, at 16 (“The common law, is a system of commonly received 
opinions, established by the common consent of the people, without acts of the legislature, 
and defined by practice in the courts of law.”); James Wilson, Of Municipal Law, in 1 COL-
LECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 85, at 549, 569 (“A customary law carries with it 
the most unquestionable proofs of freedom in the country, which is happy enough to be the 
place of its abode.”). 
210. See REID, supra note 74, at 22. Overlooking the Founders’ appreciation for the substantial in-
determinacy of natural law, James Whitman asserts that their writings about custom and rea-
son lacked coherence and intelligibility and were, instead, “a confused mélange.” James Q. 
Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1321, 1323, 1367 (1991). This position leads Whitman to the bold conclusion that “[t]here is 
little point in trying to identify the underlying logic of American legal thinking in the revolu-
tionary era,” and “[s]tudies that purport to explain the Founders’ conception of the Constitu-
tion are thus doomed to mislead.” Id. at 1366-67. In my view, Whitman gives inadequate at-
tention both to the recognition of underdeterminacy in reason, which made it far easier to claim 
simultaneous fidelity to both reason and custom, and to the rational need for established legal 
rules, including customary rules. Locke and Blackstone, for instance, each insisted that human 
law must conform to natural law, that natural law is a highly underdeterminate source of law, 
and that reason dictates that governments must act pursuant to established rules. See 1 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *42-55, *67-71; JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOV-
ERNMENT §§ 135-137 (1690), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE, supra note 111, at 159-61. 
211. See James Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra  note 
85, at 526, 529; see also, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41 (“This law of nature, 
being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation 
to any other . . . . [N]o human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this.”). 
212. HAMBURGER, supra note 113, at 38-39. 
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out of Coke or Blackstone, books I have never read, and never will, but by com-
mon sense and common honesty as between man and man.”213 Some Republican 
lawyers took a similar view. The meaning of Virginia’s press clause, lawyer 
George Hay opined, “presents a great constitutional question, the solution of 
which depends, not on cases and precedents furnished by books, but on princi-
ples whose origin is to be traced in the law of nature, and whose validity depends 
on their tendency to promote the permanent interests of mankind.”214 
Not surprisingly, then, forceful disagreements emerged about the extent to 
which the common law defined the scope of natural rights.215 During the ratifi-
cation debates, for instance, lawyers like James Wilson, Rufus King, and Alex-
ander White equated press freedom with the common-law rule against press li-
censing.216 A decade later, when Republicans attacked the Sedition Act of 1798 
as violating the freedom of the press, Federalist lawyers again turned to the fa-
miliar terrain of legal authority. “By the freedom of the press,” jurist Alexander 
Addison insisted, the Press Clause “must be understood to mean the freedom of 
the press as it then existed at common law in all the states.”217 
For Americans with less elitist inclinations, however, determining the scope 
of natural rights was not exclusively within the ken of professionally trained law-
yers. James Madison’s famous Virginia Report of 1800, for instance, made argu-
ments from “plain principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common 
practice, and essential to the nature of compacts” to wage an extended attack on 
Federalist reliance upon the common law.218 It would be a “mockery” to confine 
 
213. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMP-
SHIRE 25 (2004) (quoting Dudley). 
214. HAY, supra note 152, at 9. 
215. Of course, the divide between lawyers and non-lawyers is stylized, just like my distinction 
between elites and non-elites. See Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitu-
tion, supra note 9, at 309. 
216. See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text. 
217. ADDISON, supra note 94, at 48; see also, e.g., William Paterson, Second Dra� Opinion on the 
Sedition Law of 1798, reprinted in Williamjames Hull Hoffer, William Paterson and the National 
Jurisprudence: Two Dra� Opinions on the Sedition Law of 1798 and the Federal Common Law, 22 
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 36, 48 (1997) (“[T]he freedom of the press is a relative term; and refers to 
an existing rule. We must first know in what the freedom of the press consists . . . .The com. 
law gives the rule, which is well known to every part of the U. States.”). Federalist arguments 
about judicial power had dri�ed in some respects by the late 1790s. See Larry D. Kramer, 
Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 220-21 (2003). 
But struggles between lawyerly and non-lawyerly modes of constitutional interpretation were 
already prominent by the late 1780s. See Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Con-
stitution, supra note 9, at 304-11. 
218. James Madison, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 303, 
309 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991). The context of this passage was a defense of state 
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press freedom to a rule against prior restraint, Madison implored, because post-
publication punishments would have the same effect of suppressing expres-
sion.219 Moreover, practical experience showed that American printers enjoyed a 
“freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every descrip-
tion, which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law.”220 It 
was thus “natural and necessary,” Madison concluded, that press freedom in the 
United States went beyond the confines of English common law.221 
Scholars, it is worth cautioning, have overstressed this part of the Virginia 
Report. Madison, whose views on expressive freedom were more liberal than 
those of his colleagues, plainly identified these observations as being “for con-
sideration only,” without, “by any means, intend[ing] to rest the [constitutional] 
question on them.”222 (The Virginia Report actually rested its constitutional ar-
gument on the First Amendment’s supposed denial of federal power to impose 
any restrictions on printers.)223 Nonetheless, Madison’s mode of reasoning in 
this political dictum reflected an important strand of Republican thought 
grounded in a natural-rights view of expressive freedom. 
  
 
interpretive authority, but Madison’s language nicely captures the essence of his attack on us-
ing the common law to delineate the scope of speech and press freedoms. 
219. Id. at 336. 
220. Id. at 338. This analysis came in the midst of Madison’s discussion of “the proper boundary 
between the liberty and licentiousness of the press,” id. at 337, and the degree to which  
states, as a matter of “wis[e] . . . policy,” id. at 338, had properly chosen to underenforce  
speech-restrictive rules. The Virginia Report of 1800 never took the broad, affirmative posi-
tion that any restriction of political speech necessarily violates speech and press freedoms. 
Rather, it presented a narrower, negative argument that American protections for expressive 
freedom ought to be “greater” than in England, id. at 337, and were, in practice, “not . . . con-
fined to the strict limits of the common law,” id. at 338. 
221. Id. at 337. Relatedly, Republicans denied that judges were the exclusive or supreme arbiters of 
constitutional meaning. See Kramer, supra note 217, at 222. 
222. Madison, supra note 218, at 337, 339. 
223. See id. at 339 (“[The First Amendment] was meant as a positive denial to Congress, of any 
power whatever on the subject.”). 
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i i i . explicating the first amendment 
Now that we have a grasp on how the Founders talked about rights in gen-
eral, and about speech and press freedoms in particular, we can more closely 
evaluate the original meanings of the First Amendment. 
This Part begins with an analysis of the ratification debates and dra�ing of 
the First Amendment. It draws two principal conclusions. First, the impetus for 
a bill of rights was a desire to enumerate well-recognized rights, not create new 
ones. Consequently, historical context strongly supports the view that the 
Speech and Press Clauses incorporated the meanings of expressive freedom dis-
cussed in Part II. Second, although originalist scholarship tends to treat speech 
and press freedoms as equivalent, the ratification debates reinforce that the 
Founders o�en referred to these ideas distinctly, particularly when mentioning 
press freedom as a fundamental common-law right. 
Then, Section III.B synthesizes the evidence in Part II and Section III.A to 
assess the most likely original meanings of the Speech and Press Clauses. It ar-
gues that the Speech and Press Clauses recognized both abstract principles and 
concrete legal rules that were grounded in Founding Era rights discourse. The 
Section then responds to some competing accounts of the First Amendment’s 
original meaning. 
A. Enumerating Expressive Freedoms 
The Constitution dra�ed by the Philadelphia Convention famously lacked a 
declaration of rights.224 This omission quickly became a favorite point of attack 
for the opponents of ratification, commonly known as the Anti-Federalists.225 
Especially dangerous, Anti-Federalists insisted, was unchecked congressional 
 
224. For the defeat of proposals to guarantee the freedom of the press, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 341, 587-88, 617 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). For a more detailed 
account, see Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 9 SUP. 
CT. REV. 301, 304-08 (1990). 
225. See, e.g., George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention, 
in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 43, 43 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988). Anti-Federalists “were by no means a homogenous or co-
hesive group,” but “common themes run through many of their writings.” Wesley J. Campbell, 
Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1127-28 (2013). For the leading 
treatment of Anti-Federalism, see SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM 
AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999). For a concise history of the 
Bill of Rights, see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787-1788, at 435-68 (2010). 
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power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.226 “The powers, rights, and 
authority, granted to the general government by this constitution,” Brutus 
explained, “are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, 
as that of any state government.”227 Consequently, a federal declaration of rights 
was every bit as necessary as state declarations in order to restrict the means of 
federal power. 
Anti-Federalists o�en focused their criticisms on the lack of protection for 
the freedom of the press. But their references to press freedom were usually 
cursory, with no elaboration about what the term meant or what a declaration in 
its favor would accomplish. O�en Anti-Federalists simply pointed out numerous 
ways that the federal government could regulate printers—whether through “the 
 
226. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787) (statement of Robert 
Whitehill), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 399, 402 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (stating that “from the nature of their 
power they must necessarily be the judges, what laws are necessary and proper”); Pennsylva-
nia Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 4, 1787) (statement of James Wilson), in 2 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 467, 468 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) 
(“The powers of Congress are unlimited and undefined. They will be the judges of what is 
necessary and proper.”); Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) (statement 
of James Monroe), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1092, 
1112 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (stating that Congress would be 
“not restrained or controuled from making any law, however oppressive in its operation, 
which they may think necessary to carry their powers into effect”). 
227. Brutus II, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, 
supra note 14, at 154, 156 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003); see also, e.g., Cincinnatus I: To 
James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in id. at 160, 162 (“The conventions that 
made the state and the general constitutions, sprang from the same source, were delegated for 
the same purpose . . . .”). 
natural rights and the first amendment 
297 
trial of libels, or pretended libels against the United States,”228 taxes on newspa-
pers,229 the copyright authority,230 or federal power over the capital district.231 
Importantly, these worries o�en went beyond mere concern about prior 
 
228. An Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), Nov. 6, 1787, re-
printed in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 210, 211 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976). The following year, Findley tied the “right of every man to publish his 
sentiments on public proceedings” to the requirement of a jury trial, but he did not suggest 
that publishers were constitutionally immune from prosecution even with a jury. Pennsylvania 
Assembly Debates (Sept. 1788) (statement of Rep. William Findley), in Respublica v. 
Teischer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 335, 335-36 n.* (Pa. 1788). For other concerns about the manipula-
tions of libel laws, see Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (statement 
of George Mason), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1325, 
1326 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) (noting that Congress might con-
strue its powers to punish “any writer [who] should dare to stand forth and expose to the 
community at large, the abuses of those powers”); and Pennsylvania Ratification Convention 
Debates (Dec. 4, 1787) (statement of James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 467, 468 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (“The liberty of the press 
is not secured. Congress may license the press, and declare what shall be a libel.”). Others 
located a possible grounding for this power in the Speech and Debate Clause. See Pennsylva-
nia Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (statement of Robert Whitehill), in 2 DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 454, 454 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) 
(“The press is by this clause restrained; because the members shall not be questioned for 
speeches in any other place.”). 
229. A Plebeian, An Address to the People of the State of New York (Apr. 17, 1788), in 20 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 942, 961 (John P. Kaminski et al. 
eds., 2004); Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), in id. at 1059. 
230. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (statement of Robert 
Whitehill), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 454, 454 (Mer-
rill Jensen ed., 1976) (stating that Congress, under the Copyright Clause, “may license the 
press, no doubt; and under licensing the press, they may suppress it”). 
231. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (July 30, 1788) (statement of William Lenoir), in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEV-
ERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 76, at 203 (“[Congress] have also an exclusive legisla-
tion in their ten miles square . . . . Should any one grumble at their acts, he would be deemed 
a traitor, and perhaps taken up and carried to the exclusive legislation, and there tried without 
a jury.”); Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (statement of George Ma-
son), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1325, 1326 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) (“[C]ould they not . . . lay a dangerous re-
striction on the press? Might they not even bring the trial of this restriction within the ten 
miles square, when there is no prohibition against it?”). 
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restraints,232 but Anti-Federalists rarely suggested how an enumerated guaran-
tee of press freedom would constrain federal authority.233 
Notably, the freedom of speech played almost no role in the public jousting 
that occurred in newspapers, pamphlets, and state ratification conventions.234 
Anti-Federalist fears about unenumerated rights, it turns out, usually focused on 
positive rights that imposed more determinate limits on governmental author-
ity.235 (Scholars, by contrast, o�en describe the freedom of speech as an im-
 
232. But see An Old Whig III, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), Oct. 20, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 425, 426-27 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (identifying the Supremacy Clause as a potential threat to the 
freedom of the press). 
233. Cf. Address of the Minority of the Maryland Convention, ANNAPOLIS MD. GAZETTE, May 1, 1788, 
reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 242, 244 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995) (“In prosecutions in the federal courts for libels, 
the constitutional preservation of this great and fundamental right may prove invaluable.”); 
Cincinnatus I: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 160, 163-64 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
2003) (describing press freedom as the “only” security “that will save any future printer from 
the fangs of power” because otherwise “the judges might put the verdict of a jury out of the 
question”). 
234. An exception was the frequent Anti-Federalist inclusion of a “right to freedom of speech, and 
of writing and publishing their sentiments,” or similar phrases, in their lengthy lists of dra� 
amendments. See Virginia Convention Amendments (June 27, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 199, 202 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Sala-
dino eds., 1995); see also Proposals from the State Conventions, in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 73, at 93 (presenting similar proposals by North Carolina, Rhode Island, and the 
Pennsylvania minority); The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, VA. INDEP. 
CHRON. (Richmond), Apr. 30, 1788, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICA-
TION, supra note 14, at 769, 773 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (“That 
the people have a right to the freedom of speech, of writing, and publishing their sentiments; 
therefore printing presses shall not be subject to restraint, other than liableness to legal pros-
ecution, for false facts printed and published.”). A decade earlier, some town returns in Mas-
sachusetts mentioned the omission of the freedom of speech (or speaking, writing, and pub-
lishing) in the state’s proposed constitution. See THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 682, 742, 749-
50, 762, 789, 795, 856 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966). 
235. Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, 
supra note 14, at 1051, 1057-58 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004); see also, e.g., A Plebeian, 
An Address to the People of the State of New York (Apr. 17, 1788), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 942, 961-62 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004) 
(focusing on fundamental positive rights); Brutus II, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 19 DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 154, 156-59 (John P. Kaminski et 
al. eds., 2003) (same); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 438, 440 (1955) (same). Many Anti-Fed-
eralists mentioned the freedom of conscience, which was an inalienable natural right that had 
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portant Anti-Federalist issue, but their evidence notably mentions only the lib-
erty of the press, again highlighting the scholarly conflation of speech and press 
rights.)236 Amidst the wide-ranging and creative arsenal of Anti-Federalist argu-
ments, concern about the freedom of speech was conspicuously missing. 
In response to Anti-Federalist admonitions about the liberty of the press, 
Federalists generally made two related arguments. First, many explained that 
bills of rights were merely declaratory of pre-existing rights and were therefore 
legally unnecessary.237 It was “absurd to construe the silence  . . . into a total ex-
tinction” of the press right, John Jay insisted, because “silence and blank paper 
 
assumed a place in the customary constitution (through the Toleration Act, for instance). 
McAffee asserts that Federal Farmer’s “same analysis applied to the rights that were considered 
natural and inalienable,” McAffee, supra note 41, at 278, but McAffee errs by concluding that 
Federal Farmer viewed press freedom as a retained natural right. See supra note 193. 
236. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 3, at 1289 (noting that the “most important” rights to Anti-Fed-
eralists included “freedom of speech and press”); cf. Mayton, supra note 8, at 118 (“[A]n un-
derstanding was reached at the convention and during the ratification process that the na-
tional government had no power over speech.”). But see Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 15 (“As for 
freedom of speech, anti-Federalists said virtually nothing about it.”); Federal Farmer No. 6 
(Dec. 25, 1787), in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 979, 985 
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004) (mentioning only press freedom); Virginia Ratification 
Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (statement of Patrick Henry), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1328, 1332 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Sala-
dino eds., 1993) (same); Philanthropos [Tench Coxe], To the People of the United States, PA. 
GAZETTE (Philadelphia), Jan. 16, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFI-
CATION, supra note 14, at 391, 393 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (noting 
that, outside of Pennsylvania, “the freedom of speech” was unmentioned by leading Anti-
Federalists). Anti-Federalist references to freedom of expression usually related to the effect 
of press restraints on public discussion. See, e.g., An Old Whig I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadel-
phia), Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 
14, at 376, 378 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (mentioning, in a discus-
sion of press freedom, “free communication . . . on political subjects”); [Samuel Bryan], Cen-
tinel II, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RAT-
IFICATION, supra note 14, at 457, 460, 466 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) 
(mentioning “the right of expressing and publishing . . . sentiments upon every public meas-
ure” but otherwise focusing solely on press freedom). Mentions of the longstanding English 
right of petition were similarly rare. See Mark, supra note 82, at 2206. 
237. See WOOD, supra note 18, at 295-96; Rakove, supra note 77, at 187; John Phillip Reid, The 
Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 67, 
97; Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 171-72 (1992); Suzanna 
Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1157-58 (1987); William 
Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 502 (2005). Whether 
customary positive rights implicitly limited governmental authority continued to be a topic of 
heated discussion. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798) (opinion of 
Chase, J.) (concluding that certain fundamental positive rights were implicit limitations on 
governmental power), with id. at 398-99 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (confining judicial review to 
enumerated rights). 
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neither grant nor take away any thing.”238 The Virginia and New York ratification 
conventions later passed declaratory resolutions making the same point.239 In-
deed, many Federalists thought that fundamental positive rights were recog-
nized in the social contract,240 obviating any need for subsequent enumeration, 
just as modern legislation hardly needs to specify that it operates only within 
constitutional boundaries. 
Second, Federalist denials of authority to abridge the liberty of the press re-
lied on the lack of any enumerated power that would justify a licensing regime. 
In response to the Anti-Federalist argument that the federal government might 
abridge the freedom of the press under the taxing power, for instance, Alexander 
Hamilton asked in Federalist No. 84, “why declare that things shall not be done 
which there is no power to do?”241 But Hamilton, unlike some of his Federalist 
colleagues,242 was not rejecting all federal power over printers. Rather, he clari-
fied, “declarations . . . in favour of the freedom of the press” were not understood 
 
238. [Jay], supra note 75, at 933; see also, e.g., Uncus, MD. J. (Baltimore), Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 76, 78 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (declaring that freedom of the press is “a privilege, with 
which every inhabitant is born;-a right . . . too sacred to require being mentioned”); Foederal 
Constitution, PA. GAZETTE (Philadelphia), Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 362, 363 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1981) (“[T]he Liberty of the Press would have been an inherent and political right, as long as 
nothing was said against it.”); South Carolina Ratification Convention Debates (Jan. 18, 1788) 
(statement of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney), in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 
98, 98 (“The general government . . . has no power to take away the liberty of the press.”). 
239. See Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 25, 1788), in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1537-38 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1993); New York Declaration of Rights, Form of Ratification, and Recommendatory Amend-
ments to the Constitution (July 26, 1788), in 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICA-
TION, supra note 14, at 2326, 2326-28 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009). 
240. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 100. 
241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 114, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton); see also, e.g., A Native of 
Virginia: Observations upon the Proposed Plan of Federal Government (Apr. 2, 1788), in 9 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 655, 691 (John P. Kaminski & Gas-
pare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (“[A]s the Congress can claim the exercise of no right which is 
not expressly given them by this Constitution; they will have no power to restrain the press 
in any of the States; and therefore it would have been improper to have taken any notice of 
it.”); [Robert Sherman], A Citizen of New Haven, CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Jan. 7, 1788, 
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 524, 525 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1978) (“The liberty of the press can be in no danger, because that is not put under 
the direction of the new government.”). 
242. See James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 13 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 337, 340 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1981); Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (state-
ment of James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 
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to be “a constitutional impediment to the impositions of duties upon 
publications.”243 
When it came to natural rights, Federalists used a similar tack. Rather than 
denying any federal authority over speech, Federalists insisted that protections 
for natural liberty were superfluous under republican governments. As we have 
seen,244 that argument had considerable merit. In some sense, the people in a 
republic retained every aspect of natural liberty because no natural rights were 
surrendered to an unaccountable monarch. Enumerating retained natural rights, 
Federalists therefore concluded, would be pointless. In republics, Alexander 
Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 84, “the people surrender nothing, and as 
they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations.”245 
As the ratification contest dragged on, however, some Federalists gradually 
perceived a need for amendments to quell Anti-Federalist opposition.246 
Declaring rights, they realized, would help undercut Anti-Federalist calls for 
 
454, 454-55 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); [James Iredell], Marcus No. 4, NORFOLK & PORTS-
MOUTH J., Mar. 12, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra 
note 14, at 379, 382 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (“[T]he future Con-
gress will have no other authority over [the press] than to secure to authors for a limited time 
the exclusive privilege of publishing their works.”). But Federalists generally denied only fed-
eral power over the freedom of the press. 
243. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 114, at 580 n.* (Alexander Hamilton). Other Federalists 
equated press freedom with freedom from “the restraint of any license.” Hugh Williamson, 
Speech at Edenton, N.C., N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 25, 1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 201, 202 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Sala-
dino eds., 1986); see, e.g., Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (state-
ment of James Wilson), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 
454, 455 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (“[W]hat is meant by the liberty of the press is, that there 
should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks 
the security or welfare of the government or the safety, character, and property of the individ-
ual.”). 
244. See infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text. 
245. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 114, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton); see Shain, supra note 
158, at 127; see, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution (July 29, 1788) (statement of [Archibald] Maclaine), in 4 DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 76, at 160, 166-67; John De Witt No. 2, AM. 
HERALD (Boston), Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, 
supra note 14, at 156, 158-59 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997); see also Terry 
Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original “Original Intent,” 15 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 965, 988-97 (1992) (collecting dozens of examples). 
246. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to James Madison (ca. May 31, 1789), in 12 The 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 72, at 191, 191 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979); 
Letter from David Ramsay to Benjamin Rush (Nov. 10, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 83, 83-84 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1983). 
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broader reforms.247 Some men, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 
also came to recognize merit in the Anti-Federalist arguments.248 Although 
Congress was confined to enumerated powers, Madison explained in his speech 
introducing a dra� of amendments to the House of Representatives that it “has 
certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of 
abuse to a certain extent, in the same manner as the powers of the state govern-
ments under their constitutions may to an indefinite extent.”249 
Madison was not admitting that Congress could properly abridge customary 
rights. Nonetheless, Congress had power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause “to fulfil every purpose for which the government was established,” and 
it was “for them to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those spe-
cial purposes.”250 Madison had previously criticized declarations of rights as 
mere “paper barriers,” but in his congressional speech he justified them as having 
“a tendency to impress some degree of respect for [rights], to establish the public 
opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community.”251 
Moreover, he noted, a written guarantee would help embolden judges to uphold 
their legal duty to enforce certain rights.252 In short, an enumeration of rights 
might be useful a�er all. 
 
247. See Finkelman, supra note 224, at 336-37; see also CORNELL, supra note 225, at 158-63 (explain-
ing the modesty of the Bill of Rights); see also, e.g., Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas 
Dwight (June 11, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra 
note 14, at 748, 749 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004) (“Upon the whole, it may do 
some good towards quieting men who attend to sounds only, and may get the mover [James 
Madison] some popularity—which he wishes.”); Letter from Pierce Butler to James Iredell 
(Aug. 11, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra, at 
1288, 1289 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004) (“A few milk-and-water amendments 
have been proposed by Mr. M[adison], such as liberty of conscience, a free press, and one or 
two general things already well secured.”). 
248. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 659, 660 (1958) (“This instrument forms us into one 
state as to certain objects, and gives us a legislative and executive body for these objects. It 
should therefore guard us against their abuses of power within the feild [sic] submitted to 
them.”). Scholars have long disagreed about Madison’s private ambivalence about a bill of 
rights. See Stuart Leibiger, James Madison and Amendments to the Constitution, 1787-1789: 
“Parchment Barriers,” 59 J.S. HIST. 441, 441-42 (1993) (reviewing the scholarly debate). 
249. Congressional Debates (June 8, 1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison), in 11 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 818, 823 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al., eds., 1992). 
250. Id. at 823-24. 
251. Id. at 823. 
252. Id. at 825 (“[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner 
the guardians of those rights”). Scholars o�en misattribute to Madison the idea that enumer-
ating a right in the Constitution was necessary and sufficient for its judicial enforceability 
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Madison’s initial proposal for constitutional recognition of expressive free-
dom was divided in two parts: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of 
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of 
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”253 His notes 
suggest that he also remarked to his colleagues that speech and conscience were 
among the “natural rights, retained.”254 By contrast, his separation of the right of 
speaking, writing, and publishing from the freedom of the press suggests a pos-
itive-law connotation of press freedom.255 
This dual structure became clearer within the House Committee of Style 
when Roger Sherman proposed dividing these clauses into separate articles. In 
one article, he addressed “certain natural rights which are retained,” including 
the right “of Speaking, writing and publishing . . . with decency and freedom.”256 
Six articles later, he presented a two-part ban on licensing rules: “Congress shall 
not have power to grant any monopoly or exclusive advantages of Commerce to 
any person or Company; nor to restrain the liberty of the Press.”257 Notably, only 
Sherman’s proposed press clause, surely meant as a rule against press licensing, 
was framed as a categorical denial of congressional power. 
For unknown reasons, but probably just for sake of brevity, the Committee 
of Style shortened Madison’s proposal to read: “The freedom of speech, and of 
 
against contrary legislation. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth 
Amendment: How Does Lockean Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 
19-20 (2010). Both the wording and the context of Madison’s statement, however, indicate 
that “Madison was making a point about judicial psychology and judicial politics, not judicial 
duty.” Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
569, 571 (2017). Madison, in other words, was addressing the same types of concerns that 
Alexander Hamilton mentioned in The Federalist regarding the “natural feebleness” of the ju-
diciary, which Hamilton described as “in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or 
influenced by [the] coordinate branches . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 114, at 523 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
253. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CON-
GRESS, supra note 14, at 9, 10 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986). 
254. James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 72, at 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (“natural rights, 
retained—as Speech, Con[science]”). 
255. Madison also singled out the freedom of the press in a set of three rights that would apply 
against state governments, again suggesting an intent to treat speech and press freedoms dif-
ferently. See Congressional Debates (June 8, 1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison), in 11 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 818, 826 (Char-
lene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). 
256. Proposal by [Roger] Sherman to House Committee of Eleven (July 21-28, 1789), in COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 73, at 83, 83. 
257. Id. at 84. 
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the press, . . . shall not be infringed.”258 And, with various revisions accepted in 
the Senate, the third proposed amendment eventually read: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.”259 The dra�ers of the final version of the amendment thus, per-
haps unwittingly, stripped away the earlier textual indication that speech and 
press freedoms had distinct meanings. 
B. Original Meanings 
So, what did the Speech and Press Clauses originally mean? A detailed an-
swer to that question would require an account of what it means for a clause to 
have a “meaning,”260 both conceptually and in terms of evidentiary thresholds. 
And the Founders o�en disagreed about methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion, so assigning a definitive “original meaning” to any constitutional clause 
may require contestable methodological choices.261 Rather than venturing down 
that path, this Section simply points out a range of possibilities that—while dif-
ferent in some respects—display a substantial degree of agreement among 
Founding Era elites. In doing so, it focuses on conceptual meanings of the Speech 
and Press Clauses, not their precise doctrinal details. This synthesis suggests that 
the best account of the First Amendment’s meaning is likely one rooted in a mul-
tifaceted view of expressive freedom, recognizing the interplay of natural rights, 
inalienable natural rights, and fundamental common-law rights. Importantly, 
 
258. House Committee of Eleven Report (July 28, 1789), in COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
73, at 84, 84. For a slightly longer discussion of the Amendment’s dra�ing history, see Rosen-
thal, supra note 6, at 15-17. 
259. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
260. See generally A. P. Martinich, Four Senses of ‘Meaning’ in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s 
Theory of Historical Interpretation, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225 (2009) (classifying the four types of 
“meaning” in the history of ideas); Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional 
Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2015) (examining the role of intellectual history in constitutional 
theory). Prompted by critics, see, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Un-
derstanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 215-16 (1980), contemporary originalism scholarship focuses 
largely on the original “meanings” of constitutional provisions rather than the Framers’ in-
tentions. The distinction between intentions and meanings is somewhat porous, however, 
considering that Madison—a native speaker of the language of eighteenth-century American 
constitutionalism—tried to dra� a provision with the meaning that he intended. See Gienapp, 
supra note 10, at 938 & n.15; Solum, supra, at 1134-36. 
261. See supra note 22 (collecting sources that discuss Founding Era disagreements about methods 
of constitutional interpretation). 
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this account reveals, at least in some respects, distinct meanings of the Speech 
and Press Clauses. 
Because expression was a natural right, one possibility is that the Speech and 
Press Clauses originally referred exclusively to ordinary natural rights that were 
fully regulable to promote the public good.262 Under this view, customary pro-
tections for speech and press freedoms would likely suggest the proper bounds of 
natural liberty—perhaps even directing judges to interpret statutes “equitably” 
to avoid conflicts with these longstanding rules—but without imposing any 
fixed, judicially enforceable restraints on legislative power.263 The Speech and 
Press Clauses, in other words, might have had legal implications without consti-
tutionally ossifying any particular set of legal rules. 
This is a plausible view. Speaking, writing, and publishing were liberties that 
people could exercise without governmental intervention, and the Founders thus 
viewed these freedoms as being among their natural rights. This liberty, moreo-
ver, was circumscribed by social obligations—either imposed by natural law or 
voluntarily assumed in a social contract—and therefore only restrictions of ex-
pression beyond those that promoted the public good were “abridgments” of natural 
rights.264 Consequently, as Republican lawyer George Hay summarized in 1799, 
a natural-rights understanding of the First Amendment would “amount pre-
cisely to the privilege of publishing,” as well as speaking and writing, “as far as 
the legislative power shall say, the public good requires.”265 
Other Founding Era commentary supports the possibility that the Speech 
and Press Clauses referred exclusively to natural rights. Not all aspects of Found-
ing Era bills of rights, we must recall, had determinate meanings. Indeed, some 
declarations of rights announced principles that were, as Alexander Hamilton 
disparagingly put it in Federalist No. 84, “aphorisms” that “would sound much 
better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.”266 Provoca-
tively, and perhaps disingenuously, Hamilton insisted that the freedom of the 
press was so indeterminate that “whatever fine declarations may be inserted in 
 
262. See supra Section II.A. 
263. For an introduction to “equitable” interpretation, see HAMBURGER, supra note 113, at 344-57; 
McConnell, supra note 252, at 20-21; and Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in 
Light of Text and History, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 13. 
264. See supra notes 124-136 and accompanying text. 
265. HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 38 (Philadelphia, Aurora 
Office 1799). 
266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 114, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and 
on the general spirit of the people and of the government.”267 
Nonetheless, the Founders o�en described declarations of rights as supply-
ing stricter limits on legislative authority. A bill of rights, Theophilus Parsons 
remarked, should specify both “unalienable natural rights,” over which “the su-
preme power hath no control,” and a set of fundamental positive rights, “also 
unassailable by the supreme power.”268 Indeed, one of James Madison’s principal 
rationales for a bill of rights in 1789 was to limit the “discretionary powers with 
respect to the means” of federal authority.269 If state bills of rights were useful 
“for restraining the state governments,” Madison explained, “there is like reason 
for restraining the federal government.”270 
Viewed in this light, it makes sense to construe the First Amendment as im-
posing at least some fixed limits on federal power. There is a compelling case, 
for instance, that the Press Clause codified at least a positive right against press 
licensing, thus putting juries in charge of restricting speech.271 Meanwhile, the 
freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing—likely invoked in the Speech 
Clause—shielded from regulation any well-intentioned statements of one’s 
thoughts (subject, of course, to the natural-law proscription against abridging 
 
267. Id. at 580; see also Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4. Dall.) 14, 18 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The 
general principles contained in the constitution are not to be regarded as rules to fetter and 
controul; but as matter merely declaratory and directory . . . .”); A Countryman II, NEW HA-
VEN GAZETTE, Nov. 22 1787, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra 
note 14, at 471, 472-73 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (making a similar point); [Webster], supra 
note 140, at 484, 490 (“[A]ny restriction of [Congressional] power by a general indefinite 
expression, is a nullity—mere formal nonsense.”). In The Federalist, Hamilton expressed con-
tradictory views, stating both that without judicial protection “the reservations of particular 
rights or privileges would amount to nothing,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 114, at 524 
(Alexander Hamilton), and that placing “the whole power of the proposed government . . . in 
the hands of the representatives of the people . . . is the essential, and a�er all the only effica-
cious security for the rights and privileges of the people which is attainable in civil society,” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 114, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton). 
268. PARSONS, supra note 111, at 367; see also, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace 
(Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 78, at 350, 351 (Robert A. 
Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (describing bills of rights as providing “exceptions” to legislative 
authority); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 114, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing 
constitutional rights like the rule against “ex-post-facto laws” as “certain specified exceptions 
to the legislative authority” that are enforceable in court). 
269. Congressional Debates (June 8, 1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison), in 11 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 818, 823 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al. eds., 1992) (emphasis added). 
270. Id. at 824. 
271. See supra Section II.C. 
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the rights of others).272 As with most other enumerated rights, these principles 
constrained the means that the federal government could employ when exercis-
ing its other powers. And this positive-rights dimension of the Speech and Press 
Clauses reveals an important distinction in their meanings. 
Following this train of thought, perhaps the Speech and Press Clauses re-
ferred exclusively to these more determinate customary rules, without directly 
recognizing a retention of the broader (but shallower) natural right of expressive 
freedom. Federalists in the late 1790s, it turns out, o�en interpreted the First 
Amendment in precisely this way. “By the freedom of the press,” Addison im-
plored, the Press Clause “must be understood to mean the freedom of the press 
as it then existed at common law in all the states.”273 
Finally, perhaps the Speech and Press Clauses in the First Amendment rec-
ognized both the natural right of expressive freedom (in which the Speech and 
Press Clauses had a common meaning) and the more determinate customary 
protections for expression (in which the Speech and Press Clauses had distinct 
meanings). Like the other historical accounts of the First Amendment’s original 
meaning, this interpretation recognizes the interplay between natural rights, in-
alienable natural rights, and positive law, and it differs only by suggesting that 
this full spectrum of rights was incorporated into the Constitution itself. The 
First Amendment, on this account, recognized any customary legal principles 
that protected speech and the press while also recognizing that, apart from these 
rules, Congress was otherwise free to limit expression in pursuit of the public 
good (subject, of course, to any other constitutional constraints). In my view, 
this account best fits the available historical evidence, which shows the Founders 
constantly and fluidly moving between different notions of speech and press 
freedoms. Moreover, isolating First Amendment rights to a particular aspect of 
Founding Era expressive freedom seems dubious in light of the Ninth Amend-
ment’s implied reservation of rights. 
In sum, it remains debatable whether the Speech and Press Clauses directly 
recognized ordinary natural rights, a set of more determinate legal rights, or 
both. But because of the fluid relationship between natural rights and positive 
 
272. See supra Section II.B. 
273. ADDISON, supra note 94, at 48. That stance, however, may be less revealing of original meaning 
than of the emergent Federalist quest for judicial supremacy, which sought to separate con-
stitutional interpretation from matters of policy. Cf. Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The 
Lawyer’s Constitution, supra note 9, at 307 (“Elite legal culture in the Founding Era, particularly 
among Federalists, was designed to shore up a basic distinction between law and politics . . . . 
Proponents of popular constitutionalism generally sought to eliminate this distinction . . . .”); 
Iredell, supra note 49, at 344 (distinguishing “considerations of policy” from “questions of 
law”). 
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rights, all of these possibilities point in basically the same direction: the First 
Amendment recognized (either implicitly or outright) the ordinary natural right 
of expressive freedom along with (either absolute or presumptive) protection for 
a set of customary rules with more determinate legal meanings.274 
Other accounts of original meaning, however, are much less plausible. A 
common view is that the “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment was anal-
ogous to the “freedom of speech and debate” mentioned in Article I (and in var-
ious state constitutions).275 That freedom was a separation-of-powers rule, 
barring legislators from being punished by the executive or judiciary for their 
speeches and activities within the legislative chamber.276 But legislatures could, 
and occasionally did, punish their own members at will.277 Based on this sup-
posed genealogy of the freedom of speech, scholars o�en conclude that the First 
Amendment’s protections are confined to political expression—the type of speech 
that typically occurs in legislative assemblies.278 
This interpretation of the Speech Clause has a variety of problems. First and 
foremost, legislative privilege played basically no role in Founding Era debates 
about the First Amendment.279 This lack of historical evidence may not bother 
“intratextualists,” who are known to “draw[] inferences from the patterns of 
words that appear in the Constitution even in the absence of other evidence that 
these patterns were consciously intended.”280 This Article’s analysis, however, fo-
cuses on historical understandings of speech and press freedoms, not modern 
 
274. This account of the “original meaning” of the First Amendment is subject to the caveats men-
tioned in Part I regarding elite sources. 
275. See sources cited supra note 4. 
276. See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC 
NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 87-90 (2007); Bogen, supra note 8, at 
431-35; Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of 
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1120-40 (1973). 
277. Bogen, supra note 8, at 436. 
278. Amar, supra note 5, at 815; see sources cited supra note 5. 
279. As one scholar observes, “The tie between legislative privilege and the first amendment was 
asserted as early as 1799 by George Hay.” Bogen, supra note 8, at 435 (citing [HAY], supra note 
265). True, but Hay was defining the meaning of the word “freedom,” not the provenance of 
the term “freedom of speech.” [HAY], supra note 265, at 42 (“[T]he meaning of the word free-
dom, is precisely and unequivocally established by the constitution itself.”). Hay argued that 
this “freedom” was secured through “a total exemption from the control of any law, or the 
jurisdiction of any court.” Id. John Thomson also analogized to legislative privilege without 
suggesting that it was the originating concept for the freedom of speech. See THOMSON, supra 
note 24, at 19-20, 76-77. 
280. Amar, supra note 5, at 790; cf. William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern 
Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 494 
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textualist theories. And there simply is no evidence that anybody in the late 1780s 
thought that the freedom of speech was directly analogous to, or drew its mean-
ing from, the legislative privilege of speech and debate. Another difficulty is that 
the Founding Era right of speaking, writing, and publishing clearly extended to 
any subject, not just to political matters.281 
Other scholars assert that the Speech Clause made speech “not subject to 
legislative regulation for the public good” but “nevertheless limited by the rights 
of others.”282 Reading the text of the First Amendment in isolation might sup-
port this so-called “libertarian” view. For those Founders who defined natural 
rights without regard to social obligations, a�er all, restrictions of natural liberty 
to promote the common good could easily be understood as “abridgments” of 
the liberty that had existed in a state of nature. 
Viewed in historical context, however, this “libertarian” interpretation of the 
First Amendment is incomplete. To be sure, the Founders thought that the free-
dom to make well-intentioned statements of one’s views was an inalienable nat-
ural right, rendering improper any restrictions that did not flow from natural 
law. And since the government itself did not possess natural rights that could be 
abridged, it was beyond the power of the government to punish speech that crit-
icized the government in good faith.283 These were important departures from 
the view that speech was always regulable in the public interest. 
 
(2007) (criticizing Amar’s “assumption that careful reading of the text consistently reveals 
original meaning”). 
281. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7 (declaring the right to speak on “any subject”); 3 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874 (1833) 
(recognizing “a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever”); 
TUCKER, supra note 133, at 376 (“Liberty of speech and of discussion in all speculative matters, 
consists in the absolute and uncontrollable right of speaking, writing, and publishing, our 
opinions concerning any subject, whether religious, philosophical, or political . . . .”); Wilson, 
supra note 85, at 1055-56 (stating that natural liberty existed for man to accomplish “those 
purposes . . . as his inclination and judgment shall direct”); Letter from William Cushing to 
John Adams (Feb. 18, 1789), in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 73, at 147, 150 (“[D]oes 
[press freedom] not comprehend a liberty to treat all subjects and characters freely, within the 
bounds of truth?”). A polity could, of course, choose to reaffirm only a portion of this natural 
liberty in its declaration of rights. See, e.g., VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, § V (“That the people 
have a right of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their sentiments, concerning 
the transactions of government . . . .”). Again, my focus is the meanings of the Speech and 
Press Clauses, not the motives for enacting them. See supra note 58 (explaining my approach). 
282. Heyman, supra note 3, at 1282; see supra note 48 (discussing Philip Hamburger’s views). 
283. Individuals, by contrast, had natural rights—and particularly the right of reputation—that 
could be abridged even through well-intentioned statements, thus placing a natural-law qual-
ification on the inalienable right to make well-intentioned statements. 
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But the freedom of opinion did not encompass all expression. Individuals 
who joined together in a social contract, a�er all, had no reason to immunize 
efforts to lie or mislead. Nor did they need to prevent the government from pre-
serving norms of civility and morality, like rules against blasphemy and profane 
swearing. Indeed, the Founders constantly mentioned that the inalienable right 
to speak was limited to those who spoke with decency and truth,284 and state 
governments routinely and uncontroversially restricted plenty of speech that did 
not directly violate the rights of others.285 Evidence from the late 1780s and early 
1790s provides no indication that the First Amendment adopted a different un-
derstanding of expressive freedom. 
Just the opposite, in fact. The Founders widely viewed enumeration as a con-
servative project meant to preserve existing rights, not to change their meaning or 
scope.286 The proposed amendments, James Madison informed his congres-
sional colleagues, provided for “simple and acknowledged principles” and not 
ones of “a doubtful nature.”287 The purpose of enumeration, in other words, was 
to guarantee at the federal level the rights already recognized by state constitu-
tions and social contracts. Consequently, to the extent that states could regulate 
expression without “abridging” reserved natural liberty, the federal government 
 
284. See sources cited supra note 182. 
285. Examples include profane swearing bans, blasphemy laws, restrictions on advertising, re-
strictions on theater performances, and rules against making certain agreements on Sundays. 
See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2148-49 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis) (recounting 
many extant legal restrictions on speech); CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
HAMPSHIRE; TOGETHER WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 339 (1805) (prohib-
iting lotteries and any advertising thereof); 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVA-
NIA, 1700-1810, at 177-78 (1810) (forbidding “any worldly employment or business whatso-
ever” on Sunday, as well as profanity and swearing at all times). 
286. See Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 173, 196; Rakove, supra note 77, at 193. Indeed, the Ninth Amendment may reject “the 
necessity or superiority of enumeration.” KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 82 (2009). Some people suggested that enumeration would facilitate the judicial 
enforcement of rights, see, e.g., An Old Whig II, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), Oct. 17, 
1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 399, 402 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (“[W]ho can overrule [Congress’s] pre-
tensions?-No one, unless we had a bill of rights to which we might appeal, and under which 
we might contend against any assumption of undue power and appeal to the judicial branch 
of the government to protect us by their judgements.”), but these claims surely referred to 
legal rights and did not intimate that judges would assume the position of deciding which 
restrictions of natural liberty promoted the public good, see supra notes 232-236 and accompa-
nying text. 
287. Congressional Debates (Aug. 15, 1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison), in 11 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 1259, 1259 (Charlene Bangs 
Bickford et al. eds., 1992); see RAKOVE, supra note 4, at 324. 
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could properly do so as well.288 The freedom of expression that could not be 
“abridged,” in other words, was a liberty qualified by social obligations that 
stemmed either from natural law or from the imagined social contract.289 
Nor did the First Amendment, as some scholars suggest, elevate speech to a 
constitutionally privileged liberty interest to be defended by free-ranging judi-
cial supervision.290 Founding Era judges, a�er all, were confined to defending 
“marked and settled boundaries” of governmental authority, disregarding legis-
lation only where constitutional violations were clear.291 Judges could not apply 
jurisprudential concepts “regulated by no fixed standard” on which “the ablest 
and the purest men have differed,”292 even when those principles were enumer-
ated in a written Constitution.293 Judicial applications of the First Amendment 
were therefore limited to enforcing customary legal principles,294 even though 
 
288. Federalists made this point over and over in the Sedition Act debates. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 
5-110, at 183 (1799) (contending that press freedom had never extended, “according to the 
laws of any State . . . to the publication of false, scandalous, and malicious writings against 
the Government”); Iredell, supra note 49, at 348 (arguing that state constitutions and bills of 
rights were the “strongest proof . . . that the freedom of the press does not require that libel-
lers shall be protected from punishment”). 
289. See supra notes 124-136 and accompanying text. 
290. But see Bogen, supra note 8, at 458 (“At a minimum, the freedom of speech meant that re-
strictions on speech are impermissible unless necessary to accomplish a legitimate function of 
government, and that the courts rather than the legislature should ultimately determine that 
necessity.”). 
291. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.). The limited nature of 
Founding Era judicial review is well known. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140-42 (1893); see also Christo-
pher R. Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 169, 172-83 (2015) (documenting the strong presumption of constitutionality 
evident in early state court decisions); McGinnis, supra note 62, at 880-904 (explaining that 
early judges would find unconstitutionality only when constitutional meaning was “clear”). 
Notably, the clarity of constitutional law did not depend solely on text but “drew on well-
established principles of the customary constitution as well.” LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 99 (2004). 
292. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
293. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 13, at 99-104. 
294. Consequently, Founding Era judges repeatedly upheld narrowly drawn sedition laws. See 
BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 1-6. Wendell Bird argues that some Federalist judges rejected the 
constitutionality of sedition laws. See BIRD, supra note 3, at 474. Bird’s research is prodigious, 
but his evidence merely shows that Federalist judges accepted the freedom of opinion, not 
that they rejected the constitutionality of narrowly drawn sedition laws. See supra notes 166-
187 and accompanying text. Bird, like Leonard Levy before him, “fails to recognize that it was 
possible for the framers of the first amendment [among other Founders], influenced by re-
publican political theory, to expand the protection for freedom of expression well beyond the 
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the concept of expressive freedom, as a natural right, had a far broader range of 
potential implications. 
Finally, the First Amendment did not comprehensively ban federal regula-
tions of expression.295 This view became prominent only later in the 1790s, when 
Republicans realized that Federalist control of all three branches of the federal 
government, combined with the administration’s ability to choose jurors, threat-
ened their political survival.296 The First Amendment, many Republicans ar-
gued, imposed a “total exemption of the press from any kind of legislative con-
trol,” leaving state common-law suits for abridgments of private rights as the 
only permissible limits on expression.297 
Modern proponents of this view find support in the First Amendment’s 
opening phrase, “Congress shall make no law.”298 However, a provision that 
“Congress shall make no law past some threshold”—such as the abridgment of 
the freedom of speech or of the press—simply does not suggest a lack of 
regulatory power leading up to that threshold. If anything, it implies just the 
opposite, as Federalist defenders of the Sedition Act repeatedly pointed out with 
glee.299 
Another amendment passed by the House of Representatives in 1789 
reinforces that the First Amendment did not withdraw all authority regarding 
speech and the press. In addition to declaring that “[t]he Freedom of Speech, 
and of the Press . . . shall not be infringed”—a rule applicable only to the federal 
government—the House passed a proposal that “[n]o State shall infringe . . . the 
 
narrow boundaries of the English common law while retaining some conception of seditious 
libel.” Rabban, supra note 8, at 796. 
295. But see supra notes 36 & 41 and accompanying text. To be sure, if viewed in isolation from its 
context, the First Amendment’s text could be stretched to eliminate federal power to regulate 
speech. All that a reader would have to do, a�er all, is disregard the limits on expressive free-
dom imposed by natural law and social obligation, leading to a view that the First Amendment 
categorically prohibited any interference with expression. See Tucker, supra note 133, at 386. 
296. See Campbell, supra note 152. Although Republicans prevailed in their inventive interpretation 
of the First Amendment, an understanding of speech freedom as a natural right remained 
prominent in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 161, at 41; 1 BENJAMIN L. 
OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 222 (1832). 
297. [HAY], supra note 265, at 39. 
298. See, e.g., Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 73, at xix, lvi-
lvii; Jay, supra note 6, at 791. 
299. See, e.g., THE ADDRESS OF THE MINORITY IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT 
STATE; CONTAINING A VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
LAWS 12 (1799); ADDISON, supra note 94, at 44; Paterson, supra note 217, at 48; cf. THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 84, supra note 114, at 575, 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing concern that 
bills of rights could be “dangerous” because they could “afford a colourable pretext to claim 
more [governmental powers] than were granted”). 
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freedom of speech, or of the press.”300 If infringements of speech and press 
freedoms arose from any controls over expression, then this proposal would have 
barred state laws against libel, defamation, conspiracy, threats, profanity, 
blasphemy, perjury, sedition, and so forth. All of these laws, a�er all, suppress 
various forms of communication. But no evidence suggests that the House of 
Representatives was radically proposing to bar any federal or state limits on ex-
pression.301 Rather, the First Amendment—just like its state-restraining coun-
terparts—le� ample room for the government to regulate speech in promotion 
of the public good, so long as it respected customary legal protections as well. 
iv. using history 
How might this history inform modern constitutional interpretation? Most 
judges and scholars incorporate history into their interpretative method in some 
way.302 But uses of history vary substantially. Originalism in particular now 
comes in many forms, and the Founding Era history of speech and press free-
doms might inform originalist analysis in a range of ways. 
One option is simply to return wholesale to a Founding Era perspective, rec-
ognizing that judges are not well positioned to evaluate whether a legislature has 
acted in good faith or whether restrictions of speech promote the public good.303 
In short, this approach would call for dismantling a huge swath of modern free-
speech law. For instance, the Supreme Court’s foundational decision in New York 
Times v. Sullivan,304 which makes it harder for public officials to sue for defama-
tion, conflicts even with the libertarian strand of Founding Era thought.305 And 
 
300. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 35, 36, 39 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & 
Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) (emphasis added). 
301. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 493, 502, 508; Bogen, supra note 8, at 458 n.143. Even strict 
textualists might accept this argument. Cf. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 737 n.272 (1997) (“[T]extualist judges . . . do not categori-
cally exclude a statute’s dra�ing evolution from their consideration of statutory context.”); 
Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 361 (2005) (“[M]any textualists use 
records of a bill’s dra�ing history . . . .”). 
302. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
303. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1796 (2008). 
304. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
305. See, e.g., WORTMAN, supra note 24, at 259 (stating that public officials can sue for libel “upon 
the same footing with a private individual,” given that “[t]he character of every man should 
be deemed equally sacred, and of consequence entitled to equal remedy”); Tucker, supra note 
133, at 237-38 (same); cf. THOMSON, supra note 24, at 81-84 (calling for unimpeded public 
debate about public figures). 
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while the Founders viewed well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts as 
shielded from regulation, there is no indication that this principle would have 
extended to, say, donations to a political candidate.306 Even assuming that giving 
money to a campaign is expressive, or is an exercise of the natural right to free-
dom of association, this activity was among the countless aspects of natural lib-
erty subject to regulations that promote the general welfare. 
Of course, many who use history in constitutional interpretation also accept 
the authority of precedent and may thus perceive modern speech law as too en-
trenched to be properly overruled.307 Even under this view, Founding Era history 
may still have “gravitational force” in resolving ambiguities in modern doc-
trine.308 Judges, for instance, o�en use conflicting definitions of what it means 
for a speech regulation to be “content based,” and a historically grounded ap-
proach may help resolve contested issues of this sort.309 
If we set aside Founding Era conceptions about the judicial role,310 however, 
then modern doctrine is far easier—though perhaps still difficult—to justify on 
historical terms. In particular, a natural-rights reading of the Speech Clause 
would require the government to act for reasons that serve the public good, and 
scholars have noted that speech doctrine is largely structured as a way of smok-
ing out illicit motives.311 The heightened scrutiny that applies to content-based 
regulations, for instance, may correspond to an increased risk of parochial, rather 
than public-spirited, objectives. 
 
306. See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text. 
307. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTI-
TUTION 181-85 (2013); Baude, supra note 63, at 2358-61; McConnell, supra note 62, at 1765; 
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 861-
64 (2015). 
308. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 
420-31 (2013) (arguing that originalism can exert a “gravitational force” on doctrine, even 
when original meaning does not explicitly form the basis of judicial decisions). 
309. See infra note 328. 
310. For instance, robust judicial management of the Speech Clause might stem from a broader 
project of judicial engagement, see, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 69, at 132-49, 255-71, or process-
based concerns about regulations of expression, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-16 (1980). 
311. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 70, at 414; Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social 
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 736-44 (1998); 
Strauss, supra note 70, at 196-202. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE 
CONSTITUTION 89-95 (2001) (discussing motive tests). 
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Indeed, rather than serving as categorical legal “immunities” or “trumps,” 
modern free-speech rights o�en simply force the government to show a suffi-
cient justification for abridgments of speech.312 “Rights are not general trumps 
against appeals to the common good or anything else,” Richard Pildes explains 
about modern American law.313 “[I]nstead,” he writes, “they are better under-
stood as channeling the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in 
certain arenas.”314 A ban on all fires in public, for instance, would trigger a lower 
degree of judicial scrutiny than a ban on flag burning, even though both would 
effectively ban flag burning.315 And in either scenario, the government would 
have a chance to show that the law is sufficiently tailored to serve sufficiently 
important governmental interests. Modern doctrine, in other words, still accom-
modates certain claims to the public good.316 
But certain claims only. The Court has staunchly resisted the notion, for in-
stance, that claims to the public good might factor into the threshold decision of 
how closely courts should scrutinize speech restrictions. “The whole point of the 
First Amendment,” the Court recently declared, “is to afford individuals protec-
tion against [speech] infringements” justified by “a generalized conception of 
the public good.”317 Rather, the Court has generally relegated the public-good 
analysis to the second stage of its analysis, thus putting the burden on the gov-
ernment to show the necessity of speech regulations and giving judges respon-
sibility for ensuring, in the case of content-based regulations, that the proffered 
 
312. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1977) (defining rights as “political 
trumps held by individuals”); Pildes, supra note 311, at 728 (identifying “the view of rights as 
immunities” as “the prevailing view among rights philosophers”). Modern doctrine permits 
regulation of speech for good reasons. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral 
Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-26 (1998); Pildes, supra, at 
736-44. 
313. Pildes, supra note 311, at 729. 
314. Id. 
315. See generally United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating a federal law that 
criminalized flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning 
is protected expression under the First Amendment); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case 
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1482 (1975) (analyzing flag-desecration cases). Similarly, the government can impose criminal 
penalties on “fighting words”—i.e., speech likely to provoke violence—but it cannot target a 
more limited set of fighting words that the government finds especially objectionable. R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
316. An important qualification is that the government generally cannot justify speech-suppressing 
laws based on communicative harms. This principle finds no historical support unless one sup-
poses that its adoption, in the aggregate, promotes the public good. 
317. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014). 
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governmental interests are “compelling.” The public good can still override the 
speech right, but only rarely.318 
This approach departs from history in two ways: First, it waters down what 
was originally absolute protection for well-intentioned statements of one’s 
views—a category of speech over which the Founders o�en said that the govern-
ment simply had no power (except to regulate statements that violated natural 
law). Second, beyond this category, modern doctrine inverts the Founding Era 
understanding of freedom of speech as a natural right by putting the onus on the 
government to demonstrate a “compelling” justification for speech restrictions 
and by making judges the arbiters of what interests are compelling. Historically, 
it was up to legislators to assess which restrictions of speech would best serve the 
common good, with very little room for judicial oversight. Speech doctrine has 
thus followed a familiar pattern across an array of constitutional rights in the 
twentieth century: a vast expansion in the scope of rights coupled with a notable 
decrease in the afforded level of protection.319 
Still, history offers at least some support for our non-absolutist approach to 
expressive freedom. Given the absence of any explicit textualist basis for a tiers-
of-scrutiny approach, speech law is open to criticism by those who view rights 
as absolutes. The First Amendment’s opening declaration that “Congress shall 
make no law,” Justice Black famously insisted, does not invite judges to balance 
its protections against countervailing social interests.320 Yet if Black had read the 
text of the First Amendment in a historically informed way, he might have been 
more sympathetic to the tiers-of-scrutiny approach that his colleagues on the 
Supreme Court were beginning to adopt. A�er all, beyond their protection for a 
narrow set of customary legal rights, the Speech and Press Clauses simply rec-
ognized the natural right of expressive freedom, and natural rights were always 
implicitly qualified by legislative authority to promote the public good. 
 
318. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (upholding a content-based reg-
ulation of speech in the context of judicial elections). 
319. The same pattern has been true of press freedoms. In the early twentieth century, the scope of 
the rule against prior restraints expanded beyond just bans on licensing regimes. See Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). At the same time, the Court recognized that countervailing 
governmental interests can sometimes justify prior restraints. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sul-
livan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (collecting cases). Similarly, procedural due process rights have 
vastly expanded in scope (covering “new property,” for instance), while now providing only a 
“flexible” degree of “procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976), rather than an inflexible set of common-law procedural 
rules. One could make a similar argument about many other rights. 
320. See, e.g., Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 874 (1960); see also Alexander 
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (arguing that the First 
Amendment is absolute within the domain of self-governance). 
natural rights and the first amendment 
317 
On this view, modern doctrine is valid so long as it tries to confine the pro-
cesses of democracy to a good-faith pursuit of the public good—a goal that aligns 
with a democracy-reinforcing account of judicial review321—or, perhaps, so long 
as it confines policy outcomes to those that comport with the public good. (The 
proper level of generality to use in making these decisions is unclear.) As noted 
above,322 for instance, one could defend the tiers-of-scrutiny approach as a way 
of teasing out whether the government was restricting speech for public-spirited 
reasons or was simply trying to insulate itself from criticism. Or one might take 
the view that content-neutral regulations of speech are, on the whole, conducive 
to the public good, whereas content-based restrictions erode the benefits of an 
open speech marketplace.323 But on either view, modern interpreters must make 
our own assessments of which doctrines best fulfill these objectives. 
In giving doctrinal precision to underdeterminate constitutional provisions, 
Jack Balkin explains, “we are permitted, even encouraged, to favor some [histor-
ical] opinions over others—even minority opinions in their day—and render 
judgments on the past.”324 In other words, although the history of speech and 
press freedoms might settle the meanings of the Speech and Press Clauses, we 
can learn from the mistakes of history in deciding how to apply those provisions 
today. Founding Era support for punishing sedition and blasphemy, for instance, 
would not prevent us from making our own determination about the consistency 
of these laws with the public good. Consequently, although the constitutional 
reach of governmental power over speech is certainly far different now than it 
was at the Founding, modern speech law could nonetheless have deeper histor-
ical roots, or more feasible historical justifications, than scholars o�en realize. 
Rather than justifying modern rules in this way, however, the Supreme 
Court routinely claims to be shackled by history. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia once insisted that the freedom of speech “is the very product of an interest 
balancing by the people,” leaving no room for governmental officials, including 
judges, to assess whether restrictions of speech promote the public good.325 In a 
 
321. See generally ELY, supra note 310. 
322. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
323. Some proponents of more robust speech doctrine in the early twentieth century took this ap-
proach, emphasizing the aggregate social benefits of speech-protective doctrines. See White, 
The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 
supra note 60, at 316-21. But a weakness in this approach was the indeterminacy of questions 
about the public good and doubts about why judges were better situated than legislators to 
make these types of assessments. Id. at 322. 
324. Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 93 
(2016). 
325. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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similar vein, the Court recently rejected as “startling and dangerous” an ap-
proach to the First Amendment that would allow judges to identify “low-value” 
speech based on its utility.326 Instead, it asserted, “The First Amendment itself 
reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on 
the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to 
revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”327 
And just two terms ago, the Court seemed to treat the distinction between con-
tent-based and content-neutral restrictions as baked into the First Amend-
ment.328 
This Article has nothing to say about whether the rule against content-based 
regulations advances the public good, or whether confining low-value speech to 
traditional categories is a good idea. Those are empirical and value-based inquir-
ies that have little to do with the Founding Era. But the history of speech and 
press freedoms overwhelmingly disproves the Supreme Court’s insistence that 
modern doctrines inhere in the Speech Clause itself, with judges merely discov-
ering—not cra�ing—the First Amendment’s contours and boundaries. 
conclusion 
As a natural right, expression was originally subject to regulations that fur-
thered the public good, leading to vibrant and long-running constitutional de-
bates about expressive freedom. Nearly everyone who spoke on the issue agreed 
that well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts were constitutionally pro-
tected. A few people thought that any governmental efforts to suppress political 
speech caused more harm than good. But for most, deliberate efforts to mislead 
the public were a different matter entirely and were deserving of punishment. In 
 
326. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). 
327. Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-18, 722-23 (2012) (plurality opin-
ion) (summarizing the same idea and applying it to false statements). 
328. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015). The issue in Reed was how to identify 
“content-based” speech restrictions—a concept aptly described as “the keystone of First 
Amendment law.” Kagan, supra note 70, at 443; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Gov-
ernment Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1263 n.2 (2014) 
(collecting sources). Opting for a broader, more speech-protective definition, the Court de-
clared that the First Amendment “expressly targets the operation of the laws—i.e., the 
‘abridg[ement] of speech’—rather than merely the motives of those who enacted them.” Reed, 
135 S. Ct. at 2229 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). Historically, how-
ever, the mere “operation” of a speech restriction did not present a judicially cognizable First 
Amendment problem unless it abridged either a common-law right or the inalienable liberty 
to express one’s thoughts. See supra notes 260-274 and accompanying text. 
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sum, opinions were wide-ranging, with arguments cast at different levels of gen-
erality. It bears emphasis that, on the whole, natural rights provided only a 
framework for argument—not a set of determinate legal rights. 
The pliability of natural rights thus fostered a dynamic constitutional culture 
at the Founding. Natural liberty could be restrained, as William Blackstone put 
it, only when “necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the pub-
lic.”329 Whenever natural liberty “is, by the laws of the state, further restrained 
than is necessary and expedient for the general advantage,” St. George Tucker 
declared in 1796, “a state of civil slavery commences immediately.”330 Steeped in 
this tradition, the Founders virulently contested the scope of all sorts of govern-
mental powers—including the capacity to regulate expression—from the stand-
point of policy, all the while casting their arguments in terms of an unchanging 
original bargain. 
Recognizing the contested relationship between natural rights and legal rules 
at the Founding also has implications that resonate beyond the context of ex-
pressive freedom. Scholars o�en read constitutional phrases like “freedom of 
speech,” “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and “cruel and unusual punish-
ments” as, in the words of Jack Balkin, “abstract and vague rights provisions.”331 
Indeed, the presence of several open-textured provisions in the Bill of Rights 
seems to reinforce that the Founders o�en preferred general constitutional 
standards over specific constitutional rules.332 This Article, however, joins other 
recent scholarship suggesting that many Founding Era legal elites saw none of 
these rules as being abstract or vague. Rather, in their minds, these provisions 
simply reaffirmed longstanding features of Anglo-American law. 
In the Fourth Amendment context, for instance, Laura Donohue has shown 
that Founding Era jurists viewed the ban on “unreasonable” searches and sei-
zures as a simple reference to customary legal rules. “[A]t the Founding,” she 
explains, “there was no such thing as a ‘standard of reasonableness,’ such as has 
marked the Fourth Amendment discourse since the 1967 case of Katz v. United 
 
329. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125. 
330. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, ON THE STATE OF SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA (1796), reprinted in VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 133, at 402, 407. 
331. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 32 (2011); see also id. at 42 (identifying “abstract or vague 
phrases of the Constitution,” including “cruel and unreasonable punishments” and “freedom 
of speech”); id. at 350 n.12 (making the same point with respect to “the Fourth Amendment’s 
standard of ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures and the First Amendment’s principle of ‘free-
dom of speech’”); DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 199 (“The First Amendment, like the other 
great clauses of the Bill of Rights, is very abstract.”). 
332. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 54, at 272 (“The framers meant to enact a moral principle of consti-
tutional dimensions, and they used broad and abstract language appropriate to that aim.”). 
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States.”333 Rather, Donohue uncovers, unreasonableness meant “‘against reason,’ 
which translated into ‘against the reason of the common law.’”334 
Along similar lines, John Stinneford persuasively argues that, far from stat-
ing a “vague moral command,” the Eighth Amendment rule against “cruel and 
unusual” punishments actually called for a careful study of the common law.335 
“[T]he best way to discern whether a government practice comported with prin-
ciples of justice,” Stinneford writes, “was to determine whether it was continu-
ously employed throughout the jurisdiction for a very long time, and thus en-
joyed ‘long usage.’”336 
In part, this Article reinforces these arguments. For many Founding Era legal 
elites, the First Amendment—far from being vague or abstract—imposed dis-
crete legal commands recognized at common law. The First Amendment, in 
other words, was not designed or originally understood to provide a font of ju-
dicially cra�ed doctrines protecting expressive freedom. 
At the same time, the history of the First Amendment complicates the idea 
that seemingly abstract constitutional rights actually carried more determinate 
common-law meanings.337 Many Founders, as this Article demonstrates, force-
fully rejected lawyerly assumptions about constitutional interpretation. In this 
way, the Founders’ virulent contest over the legal implications of expressive free-
dom muddies the historical accounts offered by Donohue and Stinneford. If Re-
publicans like George Hay were right that answering “a great constitutional 
question . . . depends, not on cases and precedents furnished by books, but on 
 
333. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016); see 
also id. at 1270-71 (“That which was consistent with the common law was reasonable and, 
therefore, legal. That which was inconsistent was unreasonable and illegal.”). 
334. Id. at 1192. 
335. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1743, 1745 (2008). 
336. Id. at 1745. 
337. By overwhelmingly relying on Founding Era legal elites, Donohue and Stinneford implicitly 
accept their sources’ belief that ostensibly abstract terms like “unreasonable” and “unusual” 
should be read as legal terms of art. Stinneford discounts a contrary statement by Samuel 
Livermore during the First Congress because “Livermore . . . does not appear to have been 
within the mainstream of eighteenth-century thought regarding the usefulness of common 
law precedent generally.” Stinneford, supra note 335, at 1809. But while Stinneford is surely 
correct that Livermore was outside the mainstream of constitutional thought among legal elites, 
his view nonetheless reflected an important current in American constitutional thought. 
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principles whose origin is to be traced in the law of nature,”338 that observation 
resonated far beyond the topic of expressive freedom.339 
A scholarly focus on the indeterminacy of the original First Amendment may 
thus seem deserved. That emphasis, however, misses a crucial point. As con-
cepts, speech and press freedoms were relatively well defined, even though writ-
ten in a different language. And perhaps, with a hint of irony for those who seek 
constitutional stability in original meaning, this lost history reveals our modern 
dilemma: the proper scope of expressive freedom is le� for us to determine. 
 
338. HAY, supra note 152, at 9. 
339. To be sure, originalists might accept the more lawyerly Federalist position, leaving the 
Donohue and Stinneford positions undisturbed. But that choice, it is worth noting, would 
require accepting Federalist views of the First Amendment, too, thus undermining any plau-
sible originalist basis for modern speech law. 
